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GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED ABOUT DATAOPOLIES?
Maurice E. Stucke*
CITE AS: 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 275 (2018)

INTRODUCTION
As we transition to a data-driven economy, we are witnessing the
emergence of data-opolies—companies that control a key platform, which,
like a coral reef, attracts users, sellers, advertisers, software developers,
apps, and accessory makers to its ecosystem. Apple and Google, for
example, each control a popular mobile phone operating system (and key
apps on that platform); Amazon controls the largest online merchant
platform; and Facebook controls the largest social network platform.
Through their leading platforms, a significant volume and variety of
personal data flows. The velocity in acquiring and exploiting this personal
data helps these companies obtain significant market power.1
The European competition authorities have begun to recognize this
and have brought actions against four data-opolies: Google, Apple,
Facebook, and Amazon (or GAFA for short). (The Economist created its
own acronym, BAADD, “too big, anti-competitive, addictive and
destructive to democracy.”2)
The European Commission recently fined Google a record €2.42
billion for leveraging its monopoly in search to comparative shopping.3
The Commission also preliminarily found Google to have abused its
*

Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law; co-founder, The Konkurrenz
Group. The author would like to thank the participants of Georgetown Law’s Institute for
Technology Law & Policy’s Symposium, The Governance & Regulation of Information
Platforms, for their helpful comments and the University of Tennessee College of Law
for the summer research grant.
1
MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY (2016);
ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND
PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY (2016).
2
Evan Smith, The Techlash Against Amazon, Facebook, and Google—and What They
Can
Do,
ECONOMIST
(Jan.
20,
2018),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/01/20/the-techlash-against-amazon-facebookand-google-and-what-they-can-do.
3
Case
AT.39740,
Google
Search
(Shopping),
2017
E.C.
1/2003,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JGM8-49QC].
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dominant position with its Android mobile operating system (“by
imposing restrictions on Android device manufacturers and mobile
network operators”4) and AdSense (by “preventing third-party websites
from sourcing search ads from Google’s competitors”5). Moreover,
Google is under investigation for other possibly anticompetitive practices.6
Facebook abused its dominant position, Germany’s competition
agency preliminarily found, “by making the use of its social network
conditional on its being allowed to limitlessly amass every kind of data
generated by using third-party websites and merge it with the user’s
Facebook account.”7 The European Commission fined Facebook €110
million for “providing incorrect or misleading information during the
Commission’s 2014 investigation under the EU Merger Regulation of
Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp.”8
Apple violated the European Union state aid rules when Ireland
granted it undue tax benefits of up to €13 billion. This was not a
monopolization case. Instead, when Apple was allowed “to pay
substantially less tax than other businesses,” the result was distorted
competition.9 Ireland had to recover the illegal aid. The Commission in
2018 was also investigating Apple’s proposed acquisition of Shazam,
where concerns over personal data could play a role.10
4

European Commission Press Release IP/16/1492, Antitrust: Commission Sends
Statement of Objections to Google on Android Operating System and Applications (Apr.
20,
2016),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1492_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/S7D5-EGXY].
5
European Commission Press Release IP/17/1784, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to
Own Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-17-1784_en.htm [https://perma.cc/6DTG-W9S6].
6
Id. See also Alphabet, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Dec. 31, 2017),
https://abc.xyz/investor/pdf/20171231_alphabet_10K.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CVQ7THK5] (Argentina’s, India’s, Brazil’s and Korea’s competition authorities are also
investigating Google’s business practices).
7
Bundeskartellamt Press Release, Preliminary Assessment in Facebook Proceeding:
Facebook's Collection and Use of Data from Third-Party Sources Is Abusive (Dec. 19,
2017),
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2017/19_1
2_2017_Facebook.html [https://perma.cc/PD8R-LFLC].
8
European Commission Press Release IP/17/1369, Mergers: Commission Fines
Facebook €110 million for Providing Misleading Information about WhatsApp Takeover
(May
18,
2017),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1369_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/CC42-VHCJ].
9
European Commission Press Release IP/16/2923, State Aid: Ireland Gave Illegal Tax
Benefits to Apple Worth up to €13 Billion (Aug. 30, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-16-2923_en.htm [https://perma.cc/GM7M-3BJZ].
10
The concern is that “following the takeover of Shazam, Apple would obtain access to
commercially sensitive data about customers of its competitors for the provision of music
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Finally, the Commission targeted Amazon’s anticompetitive mostfavored nation clause.11 It also found that Luxembourg gave Amazon
illegal tax benefits worth around €250 million.12
While we will likely see more fines and behavioral (or structural)
remedies in the next few years from the Europeans, the data-opolies
largely escaped antitrust scrutiny under the Obama and Bush
administrations. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecuted Apple
and Google for per se illegal offenses.13 The Federal Trade Commission
streaming services . . . . Access to such data could allow Apple to directly target its
competitors’ customers and encourage them to switch to Apple Music. As a result,
competing music streaming services could be put at a competitive disadvantage.”
European Commission Press Release IP/18/3505, Mergers: Commission opens in-depth
investigation into Apple's proposed acquisition of Shazam (Apr. 23, 2018),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3505_en.htm [https://perma.cc/PX2Y-2UBN];
see also Thibault Larger & Simon Van Dorpe, Politico Fair Play: Tempted by the Apple
— Vestager, the Muse — Paranoid Android, POLITICO (June 11, 2018),
https://www.politico.eu/article/politico-fair-play-tempted-by-the-apple-vestager-themuse-paranoid-android/ [https://perma.cc/53GT-6HFZ].
11
A simple version of a most-favored-nation clause is when a retailer pledges to match a
rival’s discount. While it may appear pro-competitive, MFNs, at times, can lessen
competition. The Commission alleged that Amazon’s MFN:
required publishers to offer Amazon similar (or better) terms and
conditions as those offered to its competitors and/or to inform Amazon
about more favourable or alternative terms given to Amazon's
competitors. The clauses covered not only price but many aspects that a
competitor can use to differentiate itself from Amazon, such as an
alternative business (distribution) model, an innovative e-book or a
promotion.
The Commission considered that such clauses could make it more
difficult for other e-book platforms to compete with Amazon by
reducing publishers' and competitors' ability and incentives to develop
new and innovative e-books and alternative distribution services. The
clauses may have led to less choice, less innovation and higher prices
for consumers due to less overall competition in the European
Economic Area (EEA) in e-book distribution.
European Commission Press Release IP/17/1223, Antitrust: Commission accepts
commitments from Amazon on e-books (May 4, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-17-1223_en.htm [https://perma.cc/S8EN-PC6Q].
12
European Commission Press Release IP/17/3701, State Aid: Commission Finds
Luxemburg Gave Illegal Tax Benefits to Amazon Worth Around €250 Million (Oct. 4,
2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3701_en.htm [https://perma.cc/A2NDW4XM].
13
See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 297 (2d Cir. 2015) (prosecuting Apple
and several large book publishers for conspiring to raise the price of eBooks, particularly
new releases and New York Times bestsellers, where the intended target was Amazon);
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(FTC) also challenged Google’s and Facebook’s privacy violations under
Section 5 of the FTC Act.14 Notably, while the European Commission
found Google’s search bias to be anticompetitive, the FTC did not. It
argued that “[c]hallenging Google’s product design decisions in this case
would require the Commission – or a court – to second-guess a firm’s
product design decisions where plausible procompetitive justifications
have been offered, and where those justifications are supported by ample
evidence.”15
The head of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division noted the enforcement
gap between the United States and Europe: “European competition law
still imposes a ‘special duty’ on dominant market players, while we in the
U.S. do not believe any such duty exists.”16 He also noted that the DOJ
has “particular concerns in digital markets,”17 but absent “demonstrable
harm to competition and consumers, we are reluctant to impose special
duties on digital platforms, out of our concern that special duties might
stifle the very innovation that has created dynamic competition for the
benefit of consumers.”18
United States v. Adobe Systems, Inc., Civ. No. 1:10-cv-01629, 2011 WL U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83756 (D.D.C. Mar. 17, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/finaljudgment-0 [https://perma.cc/TT6Q-NHUU] (entering into civil consent decrees with
Apple, Google, and four other technology firms that prohibited them from entering into
agreements restraining employee recruitment).
14
See, e.g., Google, Inc., FTC File No. 102-3136, Dkt. No. C-4336 (Oct. 13, 2011)
(decision and order); Facebook, Inc., FTC File No. 092-3184, Dkt. No. C-4365 (July 27,
2012) (decision and order).
15
Statement of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search
Practices, In the Matter of Google, Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/295971/130103googlesea
rchstmtofcomm.pdf [https://perma.cc/6F87-WZ5E] [hereinafter FTC Google Statement].
16
Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Good Times, Bad Times,
Trust Will Take Us Far: Competition Enforcement and the Relationship Between
Washington and Brussels (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistantattorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-college-europe-brussels
[https://perma.cc/K38A-PYE2]. Contrary to the AAG’s assertion, the common law has
imposed special duties on monopolies. See, e.g., Munn v. People of State of Illinois, 94
U.S. 113, 127–28 (1876) (“There is no doubt that the general principle is favored, both in
law and justice, that every man may fix what price he pleases upon his own property, or
the use of it; but if for a particular purpose the public have a right to resort to his premises
and make use of them, and he have a monopoly in them for that purpose, if he will take
the benefit of that monopoly, he must, as an equivalent, perform the duty attached to it on
reasonable terms.”) (internal citation omitted). Moreover, monopolies, unlike other firms,
still have at times a duty to deal. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410
U.S. 366, 373 (1973) (monopoly’s consistent refusals to wholesale or wheel power to its
municipal customers constituted illegal monopolization).
17
Delrahim, supra note 16.
18
Id.
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With the divergence in antitrust enforcement, some claim bias and
protectionism.19 Others argue that it is impossible to find any way in
which consumers are being harmed when the services are free and
constantly evolving.20 Given the European and U.S. divergence over dataopolies, Part I explores one possible factor: data-opolies, under antitrust’s
consumer welfare standard, are seemingly benign. Data-opolies might
have power upstream. Google and Facebook, for example, could
conceivably dominate certain online advertising markets; Amazon could
exert significant buyer power (for books and other products).21 But
Amazon, while striking fear in many retail sectors and among suppliers, is
generally viewed as offering consumers an array of low-cost products and
services. Most of Google’s and Facebook’s services for consumers are
ostensibly “free.”22 Consequently, Robert Bork argued that there “is no
coherent case for monopolization because a search engine, like Google, is
free to consumers and they can switch to an alternative search engine with
a click.”23
19

James Titcomb, Google Launches Fightback against Record £2.2bn Brussels Fine,
TELEGRAPH (Sept. 9, 2017), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/09/09/googlelaunches-fightback-against-record-22bn-brussels-fine/
[https://perma.cc/45H6-KR89];
Foo Yun Chee, EU Antitrust Regulators Open Third Front Against Google, REUTERS
AUSTRALIAN
AND
NEW
ZEALAND
BUS.
NEWS
(July
14,
2016),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-google-antitrust-idUSKCN0ZU0YS
[https://perma.cc/9F6W-W397].
20
Adam Thierer, Can There Be a Market for Unpaid Search Results and Could Google
Be Classified as a Public Utility?, LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK (May 21, 2012),
http://www.typepad.com/services/trackback/6a00d8341bfae553ef016305aeec92970d
[https://perma.cc/R5FL-UDTS]; see generally Nathan Newman, The Costs of Lost
Privacy: Consumer Harm and Rising Economic Inequality in the Age of Google, 40 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 849, 850 (2014) (noting that the “lack of analysis of the consumer
harm from loss of data privacy is one reason Google, despite its clear dominance of
search advertising, has escaped antitrust prosecution so far in the United States” and
“Google's defenders often deny that consumers lose anything from their interaction with
Google”).
21
Evan Smith, supra note 2 (“Facebook and Google are responsible for nearly 80% of
news publishers’ referral traffic. In 2017 they claimed around 80% of every new onlinead dollar in America. Google dominates as much as 85% of online-search-ad revenue
worldwide. When you combine the stuff Amazon sells itself with the stuff others sell
using it as a marketplace, the company controls approximately 40% of America’s online
commerce.”).
22
Competition and Technology: Taming the Titans, ECONOMIST (Jan. 20, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/01/18/how-to-tame-the-tech-titans
[https://perma.cc/PQ88-PWPC] (“America's trustbusters have given tech giants the
benefit of the doubt. They look for consumer harm, which is hard to establish when
prices are falling and services are ‘free.’”).
23
Robert Bork, Antitrust and Google, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 6, 2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-06/opinion/ct-perspec-0405-bork-
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Data-opolies, unlike earlier monopolies, have not exercised their
power by charging consumers higher prices. But this does not mean dataopolies are harmless. Digging deeper, Part II provides a taxonomy of
potential harms by data-opolies. Among these potential harms are less
privacy protection; less innovation and dynamic disruption in markets in
which they dominate; and political, moral, and social concerns. Part III
discusses why data-opolies may be more durable than some earlier
monopolies.
The goal is not to vilify data-opolies. Not every dominant tech
platform will have the incentive and ability to cause harm. Instead, one
must understand the scope of harm data-opolies present, absent vigilant
antitrust enforcement. This is critical because the DOJ has only brought
one monopolization case under section 2 of the Sherman Act from 2000
onward.24 In contrast, between 1970 and 1972, the DOJ brought thirtynine civil and three criminal cases against monopolies and oligopolies.25
This abdication is not justifiable going forward, given the risks that dataopolies pose not only to our wallets but also to our privacy, autonomy,
democracy, and well-being.
I. DATA-OPOLIES THROUGH A PRICE LENS
The offense of monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman
Act has two elements: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”27 Absent a
merger to monopoly,28 a monopoly in itself is not per se illegal. In a
thoughtful opinion, Judge Wyzanski outlined what a plaintiff must show:
26

20120406_1_unpaid-search-results-search-engines-search-algorithms
[https://perma.cc/N6VP-CJES].
24
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION: WORKLOAD STATISTICS 2007–2016
(2017),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download
[https://perma.cc/E5LKX6R8]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION: WORKLOAD STATISTICS 2000–
2009 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2012/04/04/281484.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ZAE-CQ4J].
25
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION: WORKLOAD STATISTICS 1970–1979
(June 25, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-division-workload-statistics-fy1970-1979 [https://perma.cc/F7PP-5EDW].
26
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, makes it unlawful for any person to
“monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations . . . .”
27
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
28
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.
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(1) “defendant has, and exercises, such overwhelming strength in the
[relevant] market that it controls that market, (2) this strength excludes
some potential, and limits some actual, competition, and (3) this strength
is not attributable solely to defendant's ability, economies of scale,
research, natural advantages, and adaptation to inevitable economic
laws.”29 Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, antitrust plaintiffs, including
the United States, must allege the willful conduct’s “actual or potential
harm to competition.”30 Typically the behavior is characterized as
exclusionary or predatory.
Ordinarily when a company illegally attains or maintains its
monopoly, one anticompetitive effect is the monopoly itself, such as less
output, higher prices, or reduced quality.31 Under neoclassical economic
theory, another harm from a monopolist in a market with a downwardsloping demand curve is the deadweight loss. Here, the monopolist
reduces output below competitive levels and extracts a supra-competitive
price from its remaining customers. Absent perfect price discrimination,
some buyers forego or reduce their purchases at the supra-competitive
price, and this reduction represents the deadweight welfare loss. A third
harm is the cost of the monopoly’s wasteful rent-seeking activity.32
Data-opolies are unlikely to raise prices for their goods and
services. No one alleged that Facebook, in acquiring WhatsApp or
Instagram, would start charging users a fee. Instead, Facebook eliminated
WhatsApp’s small fee in some countries for its texting app.33 The
presumption is that “lower prices improve consumer welfare (all else
being equal).”34 Since data-opolies are not raising prices above
competitive levels (or reducing output below competitive levels), some
may question if they even possess monopoly power.
Quality can also increase, primarily from network effects.
“Network effects occur when the value of a product or service for a
customer increases when the number of other customers also using it
29

United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343 (D. Mass. 1953),
aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
30
Jacobs v. Tempur–Pedic Int'l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir. 2010).
31
See Duty Free Americas, Inc. v. Estee Lauder Co., Inc., 797 F.3d 1248, 1263 (11th Cir.
2015).
32
Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON.
807, 809–15 (1975).
33
Ina Fried, Facebook’s WhatsApp is Now Free, RECODE (Jan. 18, 2016),
https://www.recode.net/2016/1/18/11588896/facebook-owned-whatsapp-to-dropsubscription-fees-for-its-popular [https://perma.cc/67F2-59D6].
34
United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 332 (2d Cir. 2015) (The antitrust concern
with below-cost (i.e., predatory) pricing occurs “only if there is a ‘dangerous probability’
that the firm engaging in it will later recoup its losses by raising prices to monopoly
levels after driving its rivals out of the market.”).
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increases.”35 Telephones are a classic example. As more people purchase
telephones, more people become available to call. In turn, having more
people to call increases the value of owning a telephone. Facebook’s
social network illustrates these network effects.36
One indirect network effect is the positive feedback loop in
attracting manufacturers and developers.37 Digital personal assistants, like
Alexa and Google Home, are one example of such a feedback loop. It is
inefficient for developers to create apps, hardware, and software for every
digital assistant. Instead, developers likely focus on the top-selling digital
assistants.38 So, if more people primarily use Amazon’s Alexa, its
platform will likely attract more developers and smart appliance
manufacturers. Consequently, Alexa will learn more skills relative to
35

Case M.8124, Microsoft / LinkedIn, 2016 E.C. 139/2004 ¶ 341 (Dec. 6, 2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m8124_1349_5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W2TP-BHDE] [hereinafter Microsoft/LinkedIn Decision]; see also
United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
36
Bundeskartellamt Press Release: Preliminary Assessment in Facebook Proceeding:
Facebook's Collection and Use of Data from Third-Party Sources Is Abusive (Dec. 19,
2017),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2017/19_
12_2017_Facebook.html [https://perma.cc/WXG9-N56P]; see also Bundeskartellamt,
Background Information on the Facebook Proceeding (Dec. 19, 2017),
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Diskussions_Hintergrundpa
piere/2017/Hintergrundpapier_Facebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX7X-RN4P].
37
Indirect network effects arise when people increasingly use a product or technology
(i.e., software platforms). The more people that use the platform, “the more there will be
invested in developing products compatible with that platform, which, in turn reinforces
the popularity of that platform with users.” Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n,
2007 E.C.R. II-3601, ¶1061.
38
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C. 1999):
The fixed costs of producing software, including applications, is very
high. By contrast, marginal costs are very low. Moreover, the costs of
developing software are “sunk”—once expended to develop software,
resources so devoted cannot be used for another purpose. The result of
economies of scale and sunk costs is that application developers seek to
sell as many copies of their applications as possible. An application that
is written for one PC operating system will operate on another PC
operating system only if it is ported to that system, and porting
applications is both time-consuming and expensive. Therefore,
application developers tend to write first to the operating system with
the most users—Windows. Developers might then port their
applications to other operating systems, but only to the extent that the
marginal added sales justify the cost of porting. In order to recover that
cost, [independent software vendors] that do go to the effort of porting
frequently set the price of ported applications considerably higher than
that of the original versions written for Windows.
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competitors, increasing its appeal to prospective purchasers and, in turn, to
developers and manufacturers.
Another data-driven network effect is learning-by-doing,
exemplified by search engines. The more people who use a particular
search engine, the more likely the search engine algorithm can learn
consumers’ preferences, and the more relevant the search results will
likely become. These factors will likely attract others to use the search
engine, and the positive feedback continues.39
These data-driven network effects can magnify the competitive
stakes in winning or losing customers. Ordinarily, the effect is the gain or
loss in sales. The quality of the leading brand’s razors, for example, is not
affected when consumers switch from rival razors. In contrast, with datadriven network effects, the gain or loss in users can affect the product’s or
service’s quality. The data-opolies’ personal digital assistants, for
example, can improve in quality as more users engage with the digital
assistant and as more developers develop skills for that assistant. While
data-opolies might innovate, a significant part of the quality gains may
come simply from network effects by users and developers.
Thus, it superficially appears that through a price lens, data-opolies
pose little risk, if any, of antitrust harm. Unlike other monopolies,
especially in the pharmaceutical industry,40 data-opolies do not charge
consumers exorbitant prices. Quality can increase from network effects.
And the risk of a deadweight welfare loss or wealth transfer from these
“free” products and services appears minimal.
II. POTENTIAL HARMS FROM DATA-OPOLIES
One could further argue that the Sherman Act’s term “monopolize”
involves only economic phenomena. Antitrust’s sole objective, then, is to
promote allocative efficiency. Using the antitrust laws for goals unrelated
or antithetical to efficiency is unjustifiable. Thus, without traditional
economic evidence of economic harm (e.g., higher prices, less output),
data-opolies are, from an antitrust perspective, benign (or at least beyond
the reach of section 2 of the Sherman Act).
This reasoning has several flaws. Despite some claims to the
contrary,41 the antitrust agencies recognize that the “fact that a product or
39

STUCKE & GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 1, at 172–81; see
also Google Shopping Search, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 286–89.
40
Associated Press, Drug Prices Don’t Budge Even After Pressure from Congress, STAT
NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/11/16/drug-prices-congresspressure/ [https://perma.cc/8W77-J952].
41
See, e.g., Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C06-2057JFRS, 2007 WL 831806,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (“KinderStart cites no authority indicating that antitrust
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service is provided free of charge does not prevent the offering of such a
service from constituting an economic activity for the purposes of [their]
competition rules.”42 The United States has challenged anti-competitive
restraints when the product is free. For example, when the leading free
alternative newsweeklies illegally allocated markets, readers were harmed,
even though the publications were free.43 But even though users do not
pay money for the use of the data-opolies’ “free” services, they are not
really free. Users, the European Commission found, “contribute to the
monetisation of the service by providing data.”44 The currency for online
platforms does not have to be money. In many cases, it is data.
Second, the assumption that antitrust’s primary goal is to maximize
allocative efficiency or minimize the deadweight welfare loss is dubious.45
As the economist George Stigler said, “A careful student of the history of
economics would have searched long and hard, on July 2 of 1890, the day
the Sherman Act was signed by President Harrison, for any economist
who had ever recommended the policy of actively combating collusion or
monopolization in the economy at large.”46 Senator John Sherman, among
others, criticized trusts and monopolies for many things, but not their
deadweight welfare loss.47
law concerns itself with competition in the provision of free services. Providing search
functionality may lead to revenue from other sources, but KinderStart has not alleged that
anyone pays Google to search. Thus, the Search Market is not a ‘market’ for purposes of
antitrust law.”).
42
Google Shopping Search, supra note 3, at ¶ 152. Germany in 2017 amended its
competition law to clarify that the “assumption of a market shall not be invalidated by the
fact that a good or service is provided free of charge.” Act against Restraints of
Competition [Competition Act – GWB], May 6, 2018, § 18 (2a),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Others/GWB.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RE6-Q5JT].
43
See, e.g., Complaint filed in United States v. Village Voice Media, LLC, No.
1:03CV0164 (N.D. Ohio filed Jan. 27, 2003), https://www.justice.gov/atr/casedocument/file/515441/download [https://perma.cc/484Q-7FY7]; see also OECD, Big
Data: Bringing Competition Policy to the Digital Era: Background Note by the
Secretariat,
at
18,
DAF/COMP(2016)14
(Apr.
26,
2017),
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2016)14/en/pdf
[https://perma.cc/JG2TZ3DG] [hereinafter OECD Big Data Report] (“Competition authorities have generally
recognised the importance of quality as a competitive feature, especially when the
product or service is offered for free.”).
44
Google Shopping Search, supra note 3, at ¶ 158.
45
See Ariel Ezrachi, Sponge, 5 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 49 (2017); see also Maurice E.
Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551 (2012).
46
George J. Stigler, The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV.
1, 3 (1982).
47
See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 894 (1999)
(internal footnotes omitted):
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Finally, in looking beyond the “free” price, this Part identifies
several significant potential antitrust harms involving data-opolies, such as
degraded quality, surveillance and security risks, wealth transfers, loss of
trust, significant costs on third parties, less innovation, less autonomy, and
political risks.
A. Degraded Quality
Although antitrust enforcers in the past few decades have focused
on price effects, one long-standing and well-accepted concern of market
power, generally, and monopolies, in particular, is degraded quality.48
While data-opolies’ quality can increase on some parameters, quality can
deteriorate on other important parameters of competition, such as privacy
protection.49 A data-opolist, to the extent its business model depends on

More importantly, leading economists of the day had very little
influence on the passage of the Act. It is unlikely, then, that the
legislators who passed the early antitrust laws were aware that
monopoly pricing led to allocative inefficiency. Nothing in the
legislative history of the Sherman Act suggests that they were. No
commentator has pointed to any economic testimony that referred to a
concept resembling “allocative efficiency,” nor is there the slightest
evidence that any member of Congress was even remotely familiar with
this type of welfare loss.
48

U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & F.T.C., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1 (Aug. 19, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010 (“Enhanced market
power can also be manifested in non-price terms and conditions that adversely affect
customers, including reduced product quality, reduced product variety, reduced service,
or diminished innovation. Such non-price effects may coexist with price effects, or can
arise in their absence.”); OECD, The Role and Measurement of Quality in Competition
Analysis,
at
22,
DAF/COMP(2013)17
(Oct.
28,
2013),
http://www.oecd.org/competition/Quality-in-competition-analysis-2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7R2K-B3DX] [hereinafter OECD Background Note]; Google Shopping
Search, supra note 3, ¶ 324 (Google, the European Commission found, “could alter the
quality of its general search service to a certain degree without running the risk that a
substantial fraction of its users would switch to alternative general search engines.”); see
also Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, When Competition Fails to Optimize Quality: A
Look at Search Engines, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 70 (2016).
49
European Commission Press Release IP/16/4284, Mergers: Commission Approves
Acquisition of LinkedIn by Microsoft, Subject to Conditions (Dec. 6, 2016),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4284_en.htm [https://perma.cc/RU3N-TEXX]
(“[T]he Commission concluded that data privacy was an important parameter of
competition between professional social networks on the market, which could have been
negatively affected by the transaction.”); Microsoft/LinkedIn Decision, at ¶ 350 (Dec. 6,
2016) (“[T]o the extent that these foreclosure effects would lead to the marginalisation of
an existing competitor which offers a greater degree of privacy protection to users than

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144045
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144045

286

GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

Vol 2.2

harvesting and exploiting personal data, has the incentive to reduce its
privacy protection below competitive levels and collect personal data
above competitive levels.
This concerned Germany’s competition authority. Facebook, the
Bundeskartellamt found in its preliminary assessment, abused its dominant
position “by making the use of its social network conditional on its being
allowed to limitlessly amass every kind of data generated by using thirdparty websites and merge it with the user’s Facebook account.”50 As the
agency head, Andreas Mundt, said,
Data protection, consumer protection and the protection of
competition interlink where data, as in Facebook's case, are
a crucial factor for the economic dominance of a company.
On the one hand the social network offers a free service, on
the other it offers attractive advertising space, which is so
valuable because Facebook has huge amounts of
personalised data at its disposal. In these entrepreneurial
activities Facebook has to comply with rules and laws.
Competition law prohibits a company from abusing its
market power.51
LinkedIn (or make the entry of any such competitor more difficult), the transaction would
also restrict consumer choice in relation to this important parameter of competition when
choosing” a professional social network); Eleonora Ocello & Cristina Sjödin,
Microsoft/LinkedIn: Big Data and Conglomerate Effects In Tech Markets, EUR.
COMMISSION:
COMPETITION
MERGER
BRIEF,
May
2017,
at
5,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cmb/2017/kdal17001enn.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F57F-HZWR] (discussing how the foreclosure of competing networks
post-merger could adversely impact the choice of consumers as to the level of data
protection offered, as some competitors offered a greater degree of privacy protection to
users than LinkedIn); OECD Big Data Report, supra note 43, at 14, 18; OECD, Summary
of Discussion of the Hearing on Big Data: Annex to the Summary Record of the 126th
Meeting of the Competition Committee Held on 29–30 November 2016, at 5,
DAF/COMP/M(2016)2/ANN2 (Mar. 22, 2017) (European Commission noting that “data
protection as a measure of quality can potentially be an important aspect of competition
policy, though it is not necessarily an aspect that matters for all consumers”) [hereinafter
OECD Annex]; Robert H. Lande, The Microsoft-Yahoo Merger: Yes, Privacy is an
Antitrust Concern, FTC: WATCH No. 714 (2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1121934
[https://perma.cc/MW47-Z4ZS].
50
Bundeskartellamt Press Release: Preliminary Assessment in Facebook Proceeding:
Facebook's Collection and Use of Data from Third-Party Sources Is Abusive (Dec. 19,
2017),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2017/19_
12_2017_Facebook.html [https://perma.cc/Q2QV-UD8P] (These third-party sites
included services owned by Facebook such as WhatsApp or Instagram and websites and
apps of other operators with embedded Facebook APIs.).
51
Id.
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Because the Bundeskartellamt’s assessment is preliminary, Facebook can
formally respond. A final decision is expected later in 2018. But its
preliminary assessment raises several interesting observations about the
privacy harm.
First, the collection of too much data can be the equivalent of
charging an excessive price. Although the Bundeskartellamt’s claim rested
on unfair business terms,52 Facebook’s data collection was exploitive. The
volume and variety of personal data that users relinquished was worth far
more than what users received in exchange. Enforcers, if relying solely on
their price-centric tools, would miss this harm.
Competition authorities generally define markets and assess
market power using a SSNIP test, which asks whether a hypothetical
monopolist can impose a small, but significant, nontransitory increase in
price.53 The SSNIP test is hard to apply when the product or service is
ostensibly free.54 It may also be less relevant. For data-opolies, a more
germane test would be a SSNDPP—a small, but significant, nontransitory
decrease in privacy protection.55 In markets where many consumers are
52

The Bundeskartellamt preliminarily found that Facebook made the use of its social
network services “conditional upon the user granting the company extensive permission
to use his or her personal data.” So the competition agency challenged this as
“exploitative business terms.” The damage for the users “lies in a loss of control: they are
no longer able to control how their personal data are used.” Bundeskartellamt,
Background Information on the Facebook Proceeding (Dec. 19, 2017),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Diskussions_Hintergrundp
apiere/2017/Hintergrundpapier_Facebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/EUU6-QYNY].
53
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 48, § 4.1.1.
54
Google Shopping Search, supra note 3, ¶ 245 (“SSNIP test would not have been
appropriate in the present case because Google provides its search services for free to
users”); John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Applications, 94 WASH. U.L.
REV. 49, 65 (2016) (“This analytical framework loses its coherence in zero-price markets,
where the basic unit of value extracted from customers is not expressed as a price.”);
Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications for
Antitrust Enforcement, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 549 (2016) (“SSNIP test does not capture
the competitive constraints on the firm offering the free good, which often accrue in a
companion market”); Nate Bush, Lining Shan, & Ning Qiao, Qihoo Versus Tencent:
Roadmap or Anomaly?, 29 ANTITRUST 2, 54, 56 (Spring 2015) (discussing how China's
Supreme People's Court, in a dispute between Internet giants Tencent and Qihoo, found
the “conventional SSNIP test inappropriate in markets for free IM and security software
services since any price would represent an infinite increase” and how the Court
“suggested that other hypothetical monopolist methodologies focused on quality and
consumer experience (such as a ‘small but significant and non-transitory decrease in
quality’ test) would be more appropriate, even though they entailed greater reliance on
qualitative rather than quantitative analyses”).
55
The French competition authority, for example, noted:
the collection of consumer data has brought a price for the use of online
platforms that used to be free in the past. Hence, in the same way
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concerned about the collection and use of their personal data, privacy
protection may be of greater relevance.
One illustration is Facebook’s acquisition of the rival texting app,
WhatsApp. WhatsApp, pre-acquisition, charged some users $0.99
annually for its texting app.56 Asking whether a hypothetical monopolist
could profitably raise the texting app’s fee to $1.05 does not shed light on
the market dynamics. WhatsApp users may be more concerned about the
privacy degradation post-merger than paying an extra nickel. And the
value of the WhatsApp data to Facebook was likely worth far more than
the incremental profit from that SSNIP. Not surprisingly, WhatsApp’s and
Facebook’s senior management, post-merger, clashed over the level of
data privacy (i.e., a SSNDPP) and not on whether to impose any price
increase on users (i.e., a SSNIP).57
Second, besides degrading privacy protection, a data-opoly faces
little competitive pressure to change an opaque privacy policy.58 The
Bundeskartellamt focused on how Facebook collected and processed its
users’ personal data even when users visited other third-party websites.
For example, if a Facebook user goes to the New York Times website,
personal data is collected even when “a user does not press a ‘like button’
but has called up a site into which such a button is embedded.”59 Users
were unaware of the extent of Facebook’s tracking and data collection.60
mergers are assessed based on their potential effects on prices, merger
review should also account for the risk of increased transfers of data.
For that, traditional factors should be considered, such as whether there
are potential entrants exerting competitive pressure and whether firms
compete, in fact, on privacy / confidentially dimensions.
OECD Annex, supra note 49, at 4.
Alex Hern, WhatsApp Drops Subscription Fee to Become Fully Free, GUARDIAN (Jan.
18,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/18/whatsapp-dropssubscription-fee-free [https://perma.cc/FW8T-F4G7].
57
Kirsten Grind & Deepa Seetharaman, Behind the Messy, Expensive Split Between
Facebook and WhatsApp’s Founders, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-the-messy-expensive-split-between-facebook-andwhatsapps-founders-1528208641 [https://perma.cc/65LA-TKNG].
58
OECD Annex, supra note 49, at 6 (United Kingdom competition authority expressing
“concerns that firms may have few incentives for transparency in the absence of some
regulatory response, and that a lack of confidence by consumers may eventually
undermine the market”).
59
Bundeskartellamt Press Release: Preliminary Assessment in Facebook Proceeding:
Facebook's Collection and Use of Data from Third-Party Sources Is Abusive (Dec. 19,
2017),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2017/19_
12_2017_Facebook.html [https://perma.cc/A2VX-5YC7].
60
Bundeskartellamt, Background Information on the Facebook Proceeding (Dec. 19,
2017),
56
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As the OECD noted, “by keeping privacy policies deliberately
vague, service providers make it difficult for consumers to evaluate the
real value of their data. The user is given the immediate benefit of the
zero-price service but is unaware of the short or long-term costs of
divulging information because they do not know how the data will be used
and by whom.”61 Thus, if a data-opoly states in its privacy statement that
the data it collects across its products and services are used for advertising
purposes, is this sufficient disclosure to infer consent?62 Unlikely. At the
practical level, consent is meaningless if users are unaware what data is
collected, how their personal data will be used, and by whom.63
Third, even if the data-opoly clearly discloses the data it collects
and its (and third-parties’) use of the data, the notice-and-consent regime
is meaningless when bargaining power is so unequal that users do not have
a viable alternative option. Data-opolies usually grant service on a “takeit-or-leave-it” basis.64 Facebook simply gave its users the choice “of either
accepting the ‘whole package’ or doing without the service.”65 Potential
users often have little choice but to agree. Unless their friends and
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Diskussions_Hintergrundpa
piere/2017/Hintergrundpapier_Facebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/VHY4-U7SL]. One 2017
study sought to identify who tracked users as they surfed the Web. The study examined
over 144 million page loads in over 12 countries, including the United States, Canada,
Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria and Switzerland. The study found that “at least
one tracker was prowling around 77.4 percent of the tested page loads.” Google and
Facebook, by far, led in tacking users. Their tracking tools were found on 60.3 percent
and 27.1 percent, respectively, of the websites examined. They were followed by
ComScore (11.4 percent) and Twitter (10.5 percent). Cliqz & Ghostery, Tracking the
Trackers: Analyzing the Global Tracking Landscape with GhostRank, CLIQZ (June 12,
2017), https://cliqz.com/en/magazine/ghostery-study [https://perma.cc/M2XF-BCE7].
61
OECD Big Data Report, supra note 43, at 25.
62
Amazon,
Inc.,
Amazon
Privacy
Notice,
https://www.Amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=468496#GUID1B2BDAD4-7ACF-4D7A-8608CBA6EA897FD3__SECTION_87C837F9CCD84769B4AE2BEB14AF4F01
[https://perma.cc/3CLP-E6BV].
63
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1433 (2000) (noting how consent cannot be meaningful as to
unknown uses or unspecified recipients, so effective data privacy legislation “should
require that individuals be given specific information, and the opportunity to consent or
refuse, as to each contemplated reuse or transfer”).
64
TOM SYMONS & THEO BASS, ME, MY DATA AND I: THE FUTURE OF THE PERSONAL
DATA ECONOMY, 13, 20 (Sept. 2017), https://decodeproject.eu/publications/me-my-dataand-ithe-future-personal-data-economy [https://perma.cc/AWR9-6NBN].
65
Bundeskartellamt Press Release: Preliminary Assessment in Facebook Proceeding:
Facebook's Collection and Use of Data from Third-Party Sources Is Abusive (Dec. 19,
2017),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2017/19_
12_2017_Facebook.html [https://perma.cc/HPX2-AWD9].
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relatives all switch to another social network, any one individual cannot
feasibly switch without sacrificing the ability to interact with family and
friends, a core function of any social network. Given Facebook’s dominant
position, the German competition agency could not assume “that users
effectively consent to this form of data collection and processing.”66
Consequently, as the Bundeskartellamt assessed, market forces
will not necessarily provide the optimal level of privacy or data protection.
Monopoly power is a well-accepted market failure.67 Network effects and
other entry barriers protect data-opolies from many forms of competition.
As a result, they can depress an important parameter of non-price
competition, privacy protection, below competitive levels and collect
personal data above competitive levels. Adults in the United States, as of
mid-2018, do not have a general legal right to review the personal
information a dominant firm collects about them, revoke their consent,
refuse the further use or collection of personal information, or have their
personal information deleted.68 When it is against the data-opolies’
economic interest to provide users greater protection or control over their
personal data, privacy will suffer.
B. Surveillance and Security Risks
Granted, privacy concerns also exist in unconcentrated markets.
Data breaches, for example, occur in firms without market power. But, at
least in those markets, personal data is generally dispersed across many
firms, and competitive pressure may serve to curtail the providers’ ability
to degrade privacy. In contrast, in monopolized markets, personal data is
concentrated in a few firms, and consumers have limited outside options
that offer better privacy protection.
This raises several risks. One risk is government capture. On the
one hand, data-opolies may possess the power and incentive to thwart
66

Id.
See, e.g., Oren Gazal-Ayal, Economic Analysis of Standard Form Contracts: The
Monopoly Case, 24 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 119 (2007) (showing that when suppliers can
adjust the content of the form contract, the few reading consumers cannot correct the
market failure: “In fact, unless all consumers read and understand the form contract, a
monopoly is always encouraged to offer sub-optimal terms, i.e., terms that benefit her but
at a higher cost to the consumers.”).
68
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, which affords these protections,
applies to data collected about children under thirteen years old. See Children’s Online
Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2017). But things might change, after
California will afford residents greater privacy protection, with a law that goes into effect
in 2020. Marc Vartabedian, California Passes Sweeping Data-Privacy Bill, WALL ST. J.
(June 28, 2018, 9:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-rushes-to-tighten-dataprivacy-restrictions-1530190800 [https://perma.cc/6QKW-T23M].
67
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government surveillance.69 On the other hand, the fewer the number of
firms controlling the personal data, the greater the risk that a government
will “capture” the firms using its many levers.70 Companies need things
from the government; governments often want access to data. When there
are only a few firms, this can increase the likelihood of companies secretly
cooperating with the government to provide access to data. Moreover, a
dominant firm is likely to lobby the government on many more fronts.71
This also increases the likelihood of cooperation with governments where
doing so yields greater benefits on these other fronts. China, for example,
relies on its data-opolies to better monitor its population.72 “The data these
companies collect is richer and thicker than what the government can
collect, so the typical case now is the government going to the companies
to get information,” said the managing editor of Asia Global Institute.73
“This shows how much power the companies hold.”74
Concentrated economic and political power is a dangerous mix.
We saw this in Nazi Germany.75 As personal data is dispersed across
69

See DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H.R., AND LAB., EGYPT 2016 HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT, 2017 WL 1063649 (Mar. 2017) (noting that “in December 2015
Facebook terminated its Free Basics Service, which provided mobile phone users with
free access to a limited suite of internet services, because the company would not allow
the government to circumvent the service's security to conduct surveillance”); Alan Z.
Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 185 (2018) (arguing how
“surveillance intermediaries, the small group of giant technology companies that provide
the vast majority of consumer digital communications and data processing services,
meaningfully constrain the government's ability to conduct electronic surveillance”).
70
Kelton Sears, Alexa and the Dawn of So-What Surveillance, SEATTLE WEEKLY (Mar.
29, 2017, 1:30 AM), http://www.seattleweekly.com/news/alexa-and-the-dawn-of-sowhat-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/7YKK-8NZ3].
71
Brian Fung & Hamza Shaban, To Understand How Dominant Tech Companies Are,
See What They Lobby For, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2017, 12:55 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-silicon-valley-lobbying-20170901story.html [https://perma.cc/YL6R-XSXZ].
72
One example is Tencent Holdings Ltd. launching with the Ministry of Public Security a
pilot digital identification system. Alyssa Abkowitz, The Internet Tightens: Popular
Chinese WeChat App to Become Official ID, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2017, 7:27 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/internet-tightens-popular-chinese-wechat-app-to-becomeofficial-id-1514541980 [https://perma.cc/47AM-5C22].
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
See, e.g., Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the U.S., to Cordell Hull,
Sec’y of State, Letter on the Elimination of Cartels (Sept. 6, 1944),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16554
[https://perma.cc/BU69-MUNJ]
[hereinafter FDR Letter]:
During the past half century the United States has developed a tradition
in opposition to private monopolies. The Sherman and Clayton Acts
have become as much a part of the American way of life as the due
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many more firms and industries, there are more firms that the government
must bribe or coerce to access data. As the number of bribes increase, the
lower the likely value of each bribe, which reduces the odds that a firm
will accept the bribe in exchange for the personal data.
A second risk is covert surveillance. Even if the government
cannot capture the data-opoly directly, its rich data-trove increases a
government’s incentive to circumvent the data-opoly’s privacy protections
to tap into the personal data.76 This privacy concern also arises in
unconcentrated markets. But, at least in those markets, personal data
would be dispersed across many firms, and each firm, given robust
privacy competition, might have less personal data.
A third risk is the implications of a data policy violation or security
breach. Given the personal data’s value, a data-opoly has a significant
financial incentive to safeguard the data. But with more personal data
concentrated in fewer companies, hackers, marketers, political consultants,
and others have even greater incentives to find ways to circumvent or
breach the dominant firm’s security measures.77 The concentration of data
process clause of the Constitution. By protecting the consumer against
monopoly these statutes guarantee him the benefits of competition.
....
Unfortunately, a number of foreign countries, particularly in
continental Europe, do not possess such a tradition against cartels. On
the contrary, cartels have received encouragement from some of these
Governments. Especially is this true with respect to Germany.
Moreover, cartels were utilized by the Nazis as governmental
instrumentalities to achieve political ends. The history of the use of the
I. G. Farben trust by the Nazis reads like a detective story. The defeat
of the Nazi armies will have to be followed by the eradication of these
weapons of economic warfare. But more than the elimination of the
political activities of German cartels will be required. Cartel practices
which restrict the free flow of goods in foreign commerce will have to
be curbed.
76

See, e.g., Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google
Data Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoogoogle-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-416611e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html [https://perma.cc/ZRY8-CSHK]. One example,
according to the recent WikiLeaks, is the Central Intelligence Agency’s “Weeping
Angel” program. The CIA hacked smart televisions, transforming them into covert
microphones. The CIA could also remotely hack and control popular smartphones, which
could be instructed to send the CIA “the user’s geolocation, audio and text
communications as well as covertly activate the phone’s camera and microphone.” Press
Release, WikiLeaks, Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/ [https://perma.cc/M6E2-VEE7].
77
See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., Annual Report 13 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 1, 2018) (“As a result
of our prominence, the size of our user base, and the types and volume of personal data
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means that if one of them is breached, the harm done could be orders of
magnitude greater than with a normal company. Consumers may express
outrage over a policy violation, as was the case with Cambridge Analytica,
or a data breach. But data-opolies, protected by network effects and other
barriers, will have less reason to worry about consumers switching to a
rival platform. Indeed, despite the #DeleteFacebook campaign, Facebook,
in its first quarter of 2018, saw a thirteen percent increase in daily and
monthly active users and a forty-nine percent increase in revenue, yearover-year.78
A fourth risk is the continuing privacy harm. Even if users decide
to switch e-mail accounts, for example, the data collected on them is now
part of their consumer profile that can be sold to third-parties or used
internally for behavioral advertising or price discrimination. When the
data is merged with other data sets (or used for other purposes), new
private details about the individual can be gleaned and exploited.79
C. Wealth Transfer to Data-opolies
One concern that prompted the Sherman Act in 1890 was the
distributional effects of market power. President Grover Cleveland
observed in 1888 that with executives “madly striving in the race for
riches,” income disparities increased, creating two distinct classes: “one
comprising the very rich and powerful, while in another are found the
toiling poor.”80 Senator Sherman identified this inequality of condition,
wealth, and opportunity as the greatest threat of disturbance to social
order.81
Even when their products and services are ostensibly “free,” dataopolies can still extract wealth on several levels. As The Economist
reported, “Alphabet [Google], Facebook and Amazon are not being valued
by investors as if they are high risk, but as if their market shares are

on our systems, we believe that we are a particularly attractive target for such [data]
breaches and attacks.”) [hereinafter Facebook 2018 10-K].
78
Facebook, Inc., Quarterly Report 24 (Form 10-Q) (Apr. 26, 2018),
https://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001326801/c867f5bf-e958-4d4d-bbd0cfb1caae55a3.pdf [https://perma.cc/W77V-MRVL].
79
OECD Big Data Report, supra note 43, at 6.
80
Grover Cleveland, President of the United States, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 3,
1888), reprinted in 1 Earl W. Kintner, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 58 (1978).
81
21 CONG. REC. 2455, 2460 (1890) (This inequality “has grown within a single
generation out of the concentration of capital into vast combinations to control production
and trade and to break down competition.”).
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sustainable and their network effects and accumulation of data will
eventually allow them to reap monopoly-style profits.”82
First, the data-opoly can extract wealth by getting personal data,
including users’ likes, dislikes, intentions, and so on, without having to
pay for the data’s fair market value.83 Ostensibly, many data-opolies
provide their services for “free.” However, the personal data collected may
be worth far more than the cost of providing the “free” service. As the
OECD noted:
Google’s vast and ongoing investments to continuously
develop new products that are offered to users at a zero
price also reflect the perceived value of data. By combining
all the data collected through Android and other products,
and using its own algorithms as well as machine-learning
programmes, Google is able to enhance its detailed user
profiles with information that no other competitor has and
which should be valuable enough to recover the money
invested.84
82

Too Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-america-needsgiant-dose-competition-too-much-good-thing [https://perma.cc/L8TJ-PN6E].
83
SYMONS & BASS, supra note 64, at 17.
84
OECD Big Data Report, supra note 43, at 9. The more personal data a company
collects, the greater the variety of the data, and the faster the company can collect and
process the data, the greater the potential value of the data. This provides data-opolies a
significant competitive advantage. Newspapers now depend on data-opolies for traffic to
their websites. See Rasmus Kleis Nielsen & Sarah Anne Ganter, Dealing with Digital
Intermediaries: A Case Study of the Relations between Publishers and Platforms, 20
NEW
MEDIA
&
SOC’Y
1600,
1601
(2018),
http://journals.sagepub.com/eprint/dxNzFHygAIRHviKP9MFg/full
[https://perma.cc/6WCZ-7KUR] (noting how a “growing number of news organizations
across the world report that only about half their online traffic comes direct to their
website and app, with the rest coming from search and social referrals”). A publisher, for
example, may know what articles its readers “like” using the Facebook tool. But
Facebook also knows this. Facebook can also follow these users across its own platform,
including WhatsApp and Instagram, and across the web to any website with embedded
Facebook APIs. So, a significant information asymmetry arises between data-opolies and
other advertising vehicles. See, e.g., id. at 1611–12 (noting how the divide between those
who have and those who do not have access to detailed data goes not only between
individual users and large technology companies but also between, for example,
platforms and publishers); see also Bundeskartellamt, Background Information on the
Facebook
Proceeding
(Dec.
19,
2017),
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Diskussions_Hintergrundpa
piere/2017/Hintergrundpapier_Facebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/BS48-CCUD] (“Facebook
has superior access to the personal data of its users and other competition-relevant data.
Because social networks are data-driven products, access to such data is an essential
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The fact that the service is “free” does not mean users are fairly
compensated for their data and content.85 Suppose in a competitive
market, the personal data is worth $10. In exchange for this data, a
company offers services that are worth $1. Ordinarily, a user would
decline and opt for another service provider that (i) pays a fair price for the
data (i.e., provides the “free” service plus $9 in consideration), (ii)
provides greater value in return, or (iii) collects less personal data. As
several European Commission officials observed, if a website, postmerger, “would start requiring more personal data from users or supplying
such data to third parties as a condition for delivering its ‘free’ product”
then this “could be seen as either increasing its price or as degrading the
quality of its product.”86 Thus, data-opolies have a strong economic
incentive to maintain the profitable status quo, where users “have little
idea how much personal data they have provided, how it is used, and what
it is worth.”87
A second way data-opolies can extract wealth is by getting creative
content from users for free. In a consumer-oriented competitive market,
users could conceivably demand compensation not only for their data but
also their contributions to YouTube and Facebook. Yet, data-opolies have
diluted this power. Users effectively work for free for the data-opoly by
factor for competition in the market. The data are relevant for both, the product design
and the possibility to monetize the service. If other companies lack access to comparable
data resources, this can be an additional barrier to market entry.”); Tom Simonite, What
Facebook
Knows,
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(June
13,
2012),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/428150/what-facebook-knows/
[https://perma.cc/N63F-ZLR2].
85
Eduardo Porter, Your Data is Crucial to a Robotic Age. Shouldn’t You be Paid for It?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
6,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/business/economy/user-data-pay.html
[https://perma.cc/P2AM-TBSR]; Tom Simonite, Sell Your Personal Data for $8 a Month,
MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/524621/sellyour-personal-data-for-8-a-month/ [https://perma.cc/FJ88-QDYL].
86
Eleonora Ocello et al., What's Up with Merger Control in the Digital Sector? Lessons
from the Facebook/WhatsApp EU Merger Case, COMPETITION MERGER BRIEF, Feb.
2015,
at
2,
6,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cmb/2015/cmb2015_001_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y29C-BMXA]; Report of Study Group on Data and Competition Policy
(Summary),
JAPAN
FAIR
TRADE
COMM’N
(June
6,
2017),
https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2017/June/170606.html
[https://perma.cc/YMU8-BXCU]; OECD Big Data Report, supra note 43, at 16–17
(“market power may be exerted through non-price dimensions of competition, allowing
companies to supply products or services of reduced quality, to impose large amounts of
advertising or even to collect, analyze or sell excessive data from consumers”).
87
Tom Simonite, If Facebook Can Profit from Your Data, Why Can’t You?, MIT TECH.
REV. (July 30, 2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/517356/if-facebook-canprofit-from-your-data-why-cant-you/ [https://perma.cc/B9EL-XJ34].
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posting content, commenting on other people’s content, and supporting the
advertisers. Data-opolies capitalize on the content users post to attract
others to their platform.
Facebook notes how the size of its user base and its users’ level of
engagement are critical to its success.88 Facebook users’ postings attract
others to the social network. It is doubtful that Facebook would be as
popular if another large social network compensated users for posting
content and spending time on its platform. Indeed, Facebook users are
effectively free endorsers when they “like” a product, advertisement, or
company. Unless they specifically opt-out, users’ photo and identity can
be used in that product’s advertisements targeted at friends, family, and
others.89 If data serfs (i.e., the users) stopped toiling away for free, then the
quality and frequency of postings would decrease, and Facebook’s profit
would likely shrink. But, if due to network effects, no viable alternative
social network exists, then the data-opoly has less to fear from exploiting
user-generated content on its platform.
A third way data-opolies can extract wealth is from sellers and
suppliers upstream. At times, antitrust considers consumers and sellers as
distinct groups. But concentrated economic power, as the Sherman Act’s
legislative history reflects, can operate with a doubled-edged sword in
harming citizens as buyers and sellers.90 So too, data-opolies can
88

Facebook 2018 10-K, supra note 77, at 8 (“If we fail to retain existing users or add new
users, or if our users decrease their level of engagement with our products, our revenue,
financial results, and business may be significantly harmed.”).
89
Vindu Goel, Flipping the Switches on Facebook’s Privacy Controls, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/30/technology/personaltech/on-facebookdeciding-who-knows-youre-a-dog.html [https://perma.cc/M4N4-G7BJ] (noting that
“Facebook users effectively are free endorsers when they ‘like’ a product, advertisement,
or company; their photo and identity can now be used in that product’s advertisements
targeted at friends, family, and others”). As Facebook tells its users, “People want to
know what their friends like. That's why we show ads to your friends based on actions
you take, such as liking a Page or sharing a post.” Facebook, Your Ad Preferences,
https://www.facebook.com/ads/preferences/?entry_product=ad_settings_screen
[https://perma.cc/348S-288N]. Users have to specifically opt out of this feature.
90
21 CONG. REC. 2455, 2461 (1890) (statement of Sen. John Sherman):
These trusts and combinations . . . increase beyond reason the cost of
the necessaries of life and business, and they decrease the cost of the
raw material, the farm products of the country. They regulate prices at
their will, depress the price of what they buy and increase the price of
what they sell. They aggregate to themselves great, enormous wealth
by extortion which makes the people poor. Then, making this extorted
wealth the means of further extortion from their unfortunate victims,
the people of the United States, they pursue unmolested, unrestrained
by law, their ceaseless round of peculation under the law, till they are
fast producing that condition in our people in which the great mass of
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aggregate “to themselves great, enormous wealth by extortion which
makes the people poor.”91 The FTC, for example, investigated allegations
that Google “unfairly ‘scraped,’ or misappropriated, the content of certain
competing websites, passed this content off as its own, and then threatened
to delist these rivals entirely from Google’s search results when they
protested the misappropriation of their content.”92 Basically, Google was
stealing content from others. Google’s scraping, the FTC Bureau of
Competition found, was anticompetitive, violated the antitrust laws, and
should be stopped.93 Google’s threat “also sent a message to the broader
marketplace that Google could, and would, use its monopoly power over
search to extract the fruits of its rivals’ innovations.”94 In an unorthodox
move, the FTC closed its investigation in early 2013 after Google
promised to stop scraping.95 However, despite its promise, Google
reportedly continued to scrape, including the content of individual artists.
As one complainant noted, “Artists need to earn a living in order to sustain
creativity and licensing is paramount to this; however, this cannot happen

91

them are the servitors of those who have this aggregated wealth at their
command.

Id.
FTC Google Statement, supra note 15.
93
The FTC Report on Google’s Business Practices, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2015),
http://graphics.wsj.com/google-ftc-report [https://perma.cc/UH6Z-UKWU] (citing FED.
TRADE COMM’N BUREAU OF COMPETITION, REPORT RE GOOGLE INC. (Aug. 8, 2012))
(“the natural and probable effect of Google’s conduct is to diminish the incentives of
[rivals] to invest in, and to develop, new and innovative content, as the companies cannot
fully capture the benefits of their innovations”). There are a few caveats about this report,
which the FTC released (mistakenly) under the Freedom of Information Act to the Wall
Street Journal. First, only the Report’s even-numbered pages were released, so the
missing odd-numbered pages may have contained important qualifications. Second, other
reports, including any prepared by Google, were not released. Third, although the
Competition Staff recommended that the FTC sue Google, the Commissioners elected not
to. Google responded to the Report’s disclosure:
92

We understand that what was sent to the Wall Street Journal represents
50% of one document written by 50% of the FTC case teams.
Ultimately both case teams (100%) concluded that no action was
needed on search display and ranking. Speculation about consumer or
competitor harm turned out to be entirely wrong. On the other issues
raised, we quickly made changes as agreed with the FTC.
94

FED. TRADE COMM’N BUREAU OF COMPETITION, REPORT RE GOOGLE INC., supra note
93, at 90.
95
FTC Google Statement, supra note 15. Then-FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz and
Commissioner Julie Brill, in a press release, expected the FTC “to enforce vigorously”
Google’s voluntary commitment not to scrape. Both have left the FTC.
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if Google is siphoning traffic and creating an environment where it can
claim the profits from individuals’ creations as its own.”96
Besides scraping, data-opolies can extract wealth from suppliers by
charging them supra-competitive fees to access users.97 The Institute for
Local Self-Reliance provided several examples of Amazon “retaliating
against suppliers who resist its ever-mounting demands for bigger
discounts and more fees,” including this one:
In the early 2000s, as Amazon solidified its dominance in
the book business, Bezos initiated a campaign to squeeze
small publishers for better terms. Inside Amazon, the
campaign was dubbed the “Gazelle Project,” according to
Brad Stone, after Bezos told buyers that they “should
approach these small publishers the way a cheetah would
pursue a sickly gazelle.” One target was Melville House, a
small Brooklyn-based publisher of quality fiction and nonfiction books. When Amazon approached Melville House
and demanded it pay another sizeable fee, its CEO Dennis
Johnson bristled at the shake-down, refused to pay, and
called Publishers Weekly. A story soon appeared and the
following day, Amazon removed the buy-buttons from
every Melville House title on its site. At the time, Amazon
represented 8 percent of the company’s sales, which it
couldn’t afford to lose. “I paid that bribe,” Johnson said,
“and the books reappeared.”98
In its disputes with large publishers, Amazon also removed the buy button
for Hachette’s and Macmillan’s books.99 Amazon said that customers who
96

Samuel Gibbs, Getty Images Files Antitrust Complaint Against Google, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/27/getty-imagesfiles-antitrust-google [https://perma.cc/5WZK-EF98]. In 2018, Google and Getty entered
into a licensing agreement. See Chris O’Brien, Getty Images and Google Declare a Truce
with New Image Licensing Partnership, VENTURE BEAT (Feb. 9, 2018, 4:33 AM),
https://venturebeat.com/2018/02/09/getty-images-and-google-declare-a-truce-with-newimage-licensing-partnership/ [https://perma.cc/A4LD-FGH3].
97
EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 1, at 131–39.
98
OLIVIA LAVECCHIA & STACY MITCHELL, AMAZON’S STRANGLEHOLD: HOW THE
COMPANY’S TIGHTENING GRIP IS STIFLING COMPETITION, ERODING JOBS, AND
THREATENING COMMUNITIES 23 (Institute for Local Self-Reliance Nov. 2016),
https://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ILSR_AmazonReport_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H4U8-PN59] (internal footnote omitted).
99
United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 342 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting how the major
publishers believed Amazon's below-cost pricing was “predatory,” but understood that
each publisher “was powerless to take on Amazon,” as Amazon might “retaliate” against
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really wanted any of Hachette’s 5,000 books on its platform could go “to
one of our competitors.”100
Fourth, data-opolies can extract our wealth indirectly when their
higher fees are passed along in the prices of the advertised goods and
services. If the data-opolies faced more competitors for their advertising
services, ads could cost even less—and, therefore, so might the products
being advertised.
Finally, data-opolies can extract wealth from both upstream sellers
and downstream consumers by facilitating or engaging in behavioral
discrimination. As Virtual Competition explores, behavioral
discrimination consists of convincing consumers to buy things they did not
necessarily want at the highest price they are willing to pay.101
Data-opolies, in collecting data about their users, can directly
engage in behavioral discrimination for the goods and services they sell.102
A data-opoly can also help its advertisers discriminate. If advertisers are at
an informational disadvantage, they cannot readily identify and target
those customers who are more likely to be induced to buy the product at
the higher price. The advertiser thus relies on the data-opoly to identify
and target these consumers, with the data-opoly getting paid whenever
consumers click or see the ad.103
The data-opoly can also use its trove of personal data to price
discriminate upstream—paying merchants, workers, and authors the least
amount needed and well below competitive levels.104 Today many authors
insubordinate publishers, as it did against Macmillan, by removing the “buy buttons” on
the Amazon site that allow customers to purchase books or by eliminating a publisher's
products from its site altogether); David Streitfeld, Amazon and Hachette Resolve
Dispute,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
13,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/technology/amazon-hachette-ebook-dispute.html
[https://perma.cc/YH8K-KJXJ].
100
David Streitfeld, Hachette and Amazon Dig in for a Long Fight over Contract Terms,
N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/technology/amazonhachette-book-publisher-dispute.html [https://perma.cc/J58R-VRTD].
101
EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 1, at 85–146.
102
Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, How Digital Assistants Can Harm Our Economy,
Privacy, and Democracy, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239, 1267 (2017).
103
See, e.g., SYMONS & BASS, supra note 64, at 27 (“More recently Facebook’s data has
been used to build detailed psychometric profiles about their users wants, political
preferences and insecurities for more intimately targeted advertising. The company offers
one-to-one support to help high-paying customers to make the best use their vast
database.”).
104
Alex Hern, Authors Lose Out Again in Amazon Pay-Per-Page Scam, GUARDIAN (Apr.
26, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/26/authors-loseout-again-in-amazon-pay-per-page-scam [https://perma.cc/236C-6C22] (“Previously,
authors were paid a flat fee for every reader who downloaded their book – typically
around $1.30 (89p) per book. But after the change was introduced, they were instead paid
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rely on Amazon to publish and promote their work; they concede to
onerous demands in exchange for this service. Some writers are no longer
paid per copy downloaded on Kindle.105 Instead, Amazon pays the author
by the number of pages that people actually read of that digital book.106 If
the author cannot hold the reader’s attention until the last page, the
author’s royalties are slashed and the data-opoly pockets the profit. So, a
data-opoly can already track what we read online to transfer wealth. In the
future, the data-opolies can extract even more wealth. Through their
network and digital personal assistant, data-opolies can collect personal
data to assess the minimum amount needed for that author to produce the
e-book. Authors with a slimmer financial cushion can be more easily
exploited. (Indeed, writing-related income of full-time book authors
dropped thirty percent from $25,000 in 2009 to $17,500 in 2015. Part-time
authors saw their writing income decline thirty-eight percent from $7,250
to $4,500.107) But these wage reductions do not necessarily benefit
readers. A data-opoly, knowing who is reading each author’s work, how
far the reader gets, and how loyal the reader is, can charge loyal fans
higher prices (e.g., by not offering a discount).
In sum, a data-opoly’s anticompetitive tactics, instead of
promoting economic growth and welfare, can reduce employment, reduce
quality, and hinder innovation. The discriminatory pricing can lessen the
incentives of upstream suppliers and downstream customers (as they no
longer capture any surplus). As data-opolies expand their platforms to
digital personal assistants, the Internet of Things, and smart technologies,
six tenths of a cent for each page read, meaning that an author would have to write a 220page book, and have every page read by every person downloading it to earn the same
amount they previously got.”).
105
Alex Hern, Amazon Set to Pay Self-Published Authors as Little as $0.006 Per Page
Read,
GUARDIAN
(Jul.
2,
2015,
5:48
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/02/amazon-pay-self-publishedauthors-per-page-read-kindle [https://perma.cc/NYP6-E9HF] (discussing authors who
made their works available through Amazon’s Kindle Owners Lending Library and
Kindle Unlimited as of 2015).
106
See Royalties In Kindle Unlimited and Kindle Owners’ Lending Library, KINDLE
DIRECT
PUBLISHING,
https://kdp.amazon.com/en_US/help/topic/G201541130
[https://perma.cc/Q4XA-FEWJ] (“A customer can read your book as many times as they
like, but we will only pay you for the number of pages read the first time the customer
reads them.”); Anita Singh, Amazon to Pay Kindle Authors Only for Pages Read,
TELEGRAPH
(June
22,
2015,
5:20
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/amazon/11692026/Amazons-to-pay-Kindleauthors-only-for-pages-read.html [https://perma.cc/UR3Q-YUWU].
107
THE AUTHORS GUILD, THE WAGES OF WRITING, KEY FINDINGS FROM THE AUTHORS
GUILD 2015 MEMBER SURVEY 5 (2015), https://www.authorsguild.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/WagesofWriting_Final_10-22-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK7UJ52D].
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the concern is that their data advantage will increase their competitive
advantage and market power.108 As their capacity to extract wealth
increases, more money will flow to the data-opolies.
D. Loss of Trust
As the prior section discusses, although a data-opoly does not
charge consumers a high monetary price for its services, it nonetheless can
extract consumers’ and sellers’ wealth. When a data-opoly pays too little
(or nothing) for an individual’s content or data, some individuals may
forego writing posts or books, posting pictures, or producing quality music
and films. This loss would represent a deadweight welfare loss.
Moreover, a data-opoly’s privacy degradation can increase the
deadweight welfare loss by increasing distrust. Market economies rely on
trust. Fairness and trust, business and economic research shows, are highly
interrelated.109 On a macro level, the empirical evidence does not identify
greed as a prerequisite for a market economy. Societies with greedier
residents do not necessarily have stronger economies. Instead, norms of
fairness can play a far greater role than greed in supporting a market
economy. As Professor Lynn Stout discussed, societal norms of fairness
and prosocial behavior are both common in, and necessary for, a market
economy.110 Violations of social norms of fairness decrease trust and
increase retaliation.
For online markets to deliver their benefits, people must trust firms
and their use of the personal data. But as technology evolves and more
personal data is collected, we are increasingly aware that companies are
using our personal information for their own benefit, not ours.111 Many
U.K. citizens, its competition agency found, appeared unhappy with how
well firms explain why they collect their personal data.112 As the agency
concluded, “Consumer trust could be fragile and at risk if negative
108

See, e.g., SYMONS & BASS, supra note 64, at 59 (“As these firms grow and
increasingly encroach on one another’s space, they will seek to mine even greater
quantities of personal data. The risk is that with fewer but bigger platforms, possessing
even greater amounts of our data, consumers and other companies will be captive in
markets at the whim of a large and powerful company, able to extract greater consumer
and producer surplus for their ends.”).
109
Maurice E. Stucke, Is Intent Relevant?, 8 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 801 (2012).
110
LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE
(2011).
111
U.K. COMPETITION AND MARKETS AUTHORITY, THE COMMERCIAL USE OF CONSUMER
DATA: REPORT ON THE CMA’S CALL FOR INFORMATION 11 (2015),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/435817/Th
e_commercial_use_of_consumer_data.pdf [https://perma.cc/H92S-LJLA].
112
Id.
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perceptions about new technologies or the way firms manage data take
hold. We are concerned that future changes in the way that data is
collected and used (such as more passive collection via the [Internet of
Things]) could test how far consumers would be willing to continue to
provide data.”113
If data-opolies depress privacy protections below competitive
levels, some consumers will choose not “to share their data, to limit their
data sharing with companies, or even to lie when providing
information.”114 Consumers may forgo the data-opolies’ services, which
they otherwise would have used if privacy competition were robust. This
loss would represent what economists call a deadweight welfare loss. In
other words, as distrust increases, society overall becomes worse off.
E. Data-opolies Can Impose Significant Wasteful Costs on Third Parties
As we explore in Big Data and Competition Policy, a data-opoly
can impose significant costs on rivals through myriad anticompetitive
means, including (i) exclusive dealing to prevent rivals from accessing
critical data, (ii) leveraging its data-advantage in a regulated market to
another market, and (iii) increasing customers’ switching costs.115 Dataopolies that control a key platform, like a mobile phone operating system,
can cheaply exclude rivals by:
•

•
•
•

steering users and advertisers to their own products and services to
the detriment of rival sellers on the platform (and contrary to
consumers’ wishes);
degrading an independent app’s functionality;
reducing traffic to an independent app by making it harder to find
on its search engine or app store; or
limiting an app’s ability to deliver, target, or measure the
effectiveness of ads for any app whose revenues are primarily from
advertising.116

113

Id. at 12.
Id. at 146.
115
STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 1, at chapter 18.
116
Id.; see also OECD Annex, supra note 49, at 5 (for exclusionary practices, the
European Commission suggests “treating data as any other input: for instance, in vertical
mergers, one should consider the risks of foreclosure; and, in exclusionary abuses, one
should weight carefully remedies such as requirements to share data. But before any such
interventions, it is crucial to identify whether data is a key element for product success,
whether data is replicable or available from other sources, and how quickly data becomes
outdated”).
114
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Data-opolies, to increase the flow of personal data, can also impose
costs on companies seeking to promote privacy interests. One example,
which our book, Virtual Competition, discusses, is Google kicking the
privacy app, Disconnect, out of its Android app store.117 Important for our
purposes is that the cost to Google was likely to be low, while the cost to
Disconnect was high, as it became harder to reach Android users.
F. Less Innovation in Markets Dominated by Data-opolies
In 2004, the Supreme Court defended short-run allocative
efficiency losses from monopolists with the belief that monopoly rents
attract business acumen and risk-taking that produces innovation and
economic growth.118 The Court assumed that companies enter a market,
innovate, and compete with the expectation of monopoly rents. This is
questionable. The OECD and others have found “little empirical support”
for the hypothesis that large firm size or high concentration is strongly
associated with a higher level of innovative activity.119 The competitive
dynamics are more complex. Some monopolies and oligopolies
continually innovate to maintain their competitive edge. Some, like AT&T

117

EZRACHI & STUCKE, supra note 1, at chapter 16. Disconnect Inc. filed with the
European Commission an antitrust complaint against Google. The app maker claimed
Google abused its dominant position when it banned from its Google Play store
Disconnect’s Android app. Disconnect Mobile protects users “from invisible tracking and
malvertising, malware served through ads and tracking connections.” Press Release,
Disconnect, We Filed an EU Antitrust Complaint against Google (June 6, 2015),
https://blog.disconnect.me/our-eu-antitrust-complaint-against-google/
[https://perma.cc/Q8YL-GAGD]. As Disconnect alleged, Google abused its dominant
position on Android, the Play Store, and Chrome mobile in at least two ways: “First,
Google integrates its own ineffective and often misleading privacy and security ‘features’
into its dominant products, thereby giving itself an unfair market advantage and harming
consumers in the process. Second, Google uses its market power to discriminate against
Disconnect, by denying us access to the distribution and other benefits that come with
being in the Play Store.” Id. The complaint as of June 2018 is pending.
118
Verizon Comms. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004) (“opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what attracts
‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and
economic growth”).
119
Sanghoon Ahn, Competition, Innovation and Productivity Growth: A Review of
Theory & Evidence at 3, 5, 14–15 (OECD, Economic Working Paper No. 317, Jan. 17,
2002),
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ECO/WKP(20
02)3&docLanguage=En [https://perma.cc/CW4Q-8FHH]; see also JONATHAN B. BAKER,
MARKET
POWER
IN
THE
U.S.
ECONOMY
TODAY
(2017),
http://equitablegrowth.org/research-analysis/market-power-in-the-u-s-economy-today/
[https://perma.cc/VR7N-EDZE].
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and IBM, innovate but dictate for many years the progress of innovation.
Some monopolies restrain innovation.120
The same is true with data-opolies. Some of their innovations can
harm users. For example, their innovations, in furthering their ability to
track users and collect their data, can reduce users’ privacy.121 The New
York Times reviewed hundreds of Facebook’s patent applications. Its
review revealed how “the company has considered tracking almost every
aspect of its users’ lives: where you are, who you spend time with,
whether you’re in a romantic relationship, which brands and politicians
you’re talking about. The company has even attempted to patent a method
for predicting when your friends will die.”122
Data-opolies can also hinder innovations that threaten their power
or profits. Data-opolies that rely on advertising revenues may view some
privacy technologies as a threat.123 Data-opolies can hinder others on their
super-platform by introducing innovations that protect individuals’
privacy interests. Data-opolies can determine what technology to
promote.124 In determining who can access their trove of data, data-opolies
can “cut off any developer who poses a competitive threat.”125
120

Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 497 (2009).
121
See, e.g., Google Starts Tracking Offline Shopping—What You Buy at Stores in
Person,
L.A.
TIMES
(May
23,
2017,
2:25
PM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-google-ads-tracking-20170523story.html [https://perma.cc/FH2T-XBNC] (reporting how Google developed a new tool
to “track how much money people spend in merchants' bricks-and-mortar stores after
clicking on their digital ads”).
122
Sahil Chinoy, What 7 Creepy Patents Reveal About Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (June 21,
2018), https://nyti.ms/2MGqm7T [https://perma.cc/MR9C-9LYD].
123
See, e.g., Facebook 2018 10-K, supra note 77, at 20:
Technologies have been developed, and will likely continue to be
developed, that can block the display of our ads or block our ad
measurement tools, particularly for advertising displayed on personal
computers. We generate substantially all of our revenue from
advertising, including revenue resulting from the display of ads on
personal computers. Revenue generated from the display of ads on
personal computers has been impacted by these technologies from time
to time. As a result, these technologies have had an adverse effect on
our financial results and, if such technologies continue to proliferate, in
particular with respect to mobile platforms, our future financial results
may be harmed.
124

“One criticism of Google’s leading role in a standard-setting process to block ads,
including on its leading browser Chrome, was “that the blacklisted ad formats generally
don’t apply to Google’s own business, according to people who were part of the process.”
Douglas MacMillan, Google Will Block Spammy Ads (Just Not Many of Its Own), WALL
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Data-opolies also have innovation-chilling weapons that earlier
monopolies, like Microsoft and IBM, lacked. Past monopolies were
relatively less aware of what their customers and rivals were doing (or
planning to do). As our book discusses, some platforms currently have a
relative advantage in accessing and analysing data to discern threats well
before others, including the government.126 They can “nowcast,” also
called “predict the present,” by using search inquiries, social network
postings, tweets, and other data to discern trends. Nowcasting can yield a
competitive advantage and, at times, increase overall welfare in
forecasting, among other things, flu epidemics, unemployment levels,
number of Food Stamp recipients, or fishing harvests.127 Nowcasting also
represents a potent data-based weapon not previously available for
monopolies: the ability to monitor new business models in real time. The
data-opoly can use its relative advantage in accessing and processing
personal data, such as watching for trends in its proprietary data from
ST. J. (Feb. 14, 2018, 10:54 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-google-swayedefforts-to-block-annoying-online-ads-1518623663 [https://perma.cc/XD8X-VLPZ]; see
also Samuel Gibbs, Google Turns on Default Ad Blocker Within Chrome, GUARDIAN
(Feb. 15, 2018, 4:39 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/feb/15/googleadblocker-chrome-browser [https://perma.cc/2RDP-8HF4].
125
SYMONS & BASS, supra note 64, at 27–28 (noting how powerful platforms can reduce
opportunities for innovation: “At present, some platforms do make their data available
through APIs in their websites. For instance, Facebook allows developers to build on top
of their platform with access to data . . . . However, companies will set the rules about the
sharing of their own data. Facebook use their API to control who gets access to
customers’ social graph, Facebook Connect and Graph API. They can use this to cut off
any developer who poses a competitive threat. The result is that few developers invest
seriously in creating alternatives.”).
126
STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 1, at 285–87.
127
See, e.g., Vasileios Lampos et al., Advances in Nowcasting Influenza-Like Illness
Rates Using Search Query Logs, SCIENTIFIC REPORTS, DOI:10.1038/srep12760, Aug. 7,
2015 (applying a nonlinear query modeling approach to lower the cumulative nowcasting
error in predicting influenza); Jaroslav Pavlicek & Ladislav Kristoufek, Nowcasting
Unemployment Rates with Google Searches: Evidence from the Visegrad Group
Countries, 10 PLOS ONE 1, DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0127084, May 2015, at 1–11
(showing that Google searches enhance nowcasting models of unemployment rates for
the Czech Republic and Hungary but not for Poland and Slovakia); David W. Carter et
al., Nowcasting Intraseasonal Recreational Fishing Harvest with Internet Search
Volume, 10 PLOS ONE 1, DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0137752, Sept. 8, 2015 (examining
the potential for using nowcasting with Google Trends Internet search information to
generate predictions of the recreational fishing harvest before official estimates are
available); Dean Fantazzini, Nowcasting and Forecasting the Monthly Food Stamps Data
in
the
US
Using
Online
Search
Data,
9.1
PLOS
ONE
1,
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0111894, Nov. 2014, at 1–27 (proposing the use of Google
data based on Internet searches about food stamps as a potential indicator to nowcast and
forecast the US monthly number of individuals participating in the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program).
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posts on a social network, search queries, emails, and the like, to quickly
identify (and squelch) nascent competitive threats. The dominant firm can
acquire entrants before they become significant competitive threats or
blunt the entrants’ growth. It can manipulate its search engine results to
make it harder to find the entrants or remove them from the app store.128
Facebook, for example, warns investors that its “[p]latform
partners may use information shared by our users through the Facebook
Platform in order to develop products or features that compete with us.”129
But Facebook acquired the data-security app, Onavo, to track users’
smartphone activity. This nowcasting radar
helped [Facebook] spot several potential threats, including
Instagram, a photo app, which it bought in 2012;
WhatsApp, a messaging service, for which it paid a
stunning $22bn in 2014; and tbh, a social-polling app,
which it acquired last year [2017]. When Snapchat rebuffed
it in 2013, it responded by cloning the app’s most
successful features.130
Thus, data-opolies with their nowcasting radar system can monitor
competitive portals, in real time, where start-ups may emerge.131 They can
track the nascent competitive threats shortly after they take off and
128

Johannes Laitenberger, Director-General for Competition, European Comm’n, Speech
at the MLex/Hogan Lovells Event in Brussels, EU Competition Law in Innovation and
Digital Markets: Fairness and the Consumer Welfare Perspective (Oct. 10, 2017),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2017_15_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DZ8NP9Z] (noting how “many of today's startup owners want to be acquired instead of
growing to challenge the incumbents,” how startup owners “are faced with a stark choice:
struggling to survive or pitching their business to the online giants,” and how in the last
decade, “Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft made 436 acquisitions worth
a total of 131 billion dollars”).
129
Facebook
Inc.,
Annual
Report
15
(Form
10-K)
(2012),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680113000003/fb12312012x10k.htm [https://perma.cc/G33B-2E8Y].
130
Smith, supra note 2.
131
In complex adaptive ecosystems, such as many technology industries, innovation and
dynamic forces may need competitive portals, i.e., critical inflection points when antitrust
can make a key difference. When the competitive portals are open, entry, expansion, or
random events during these periods of competitive opportunity can foster
experimentation and significant innovation. On the other hand, a dominant firm may use
its market power to close the competitive portals. Thus, abuses by data-opolies, if
unchecked, may have greater negative implications beyond that immediate industry and
time-frame. See STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 1, at 277, 281–85; ANDREW I. GAVIL &
HARRY FIRST, THE MICROSOFT ANTITRUST CASES: COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 324–25 (2014) (discussing the importance of preserving
“competitive moments”).
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intercept or shoot them down long before they become visible to
competition authorities and others. For start-ups, the prospect of becoming
a target can chill their incentive to innovate in ways that potentially
threaten a data-opoly’s power.
G. Social and Moral Concerns
Historically, antitrust laws have also been concerned with how
monopolies can hinder individual autonomy. Although competition policy
generally is not considered a human rights issue, courts have long
recognized that concentrated economic power tends to impoverish
individuals of their livelihood and threaten inclusive growth that enhances
human and institutional capacity.132 As courts noted long ago, when
monopolies flourish, workers, who provided for their families, “will of
necessity, be constrained to live in idleness and beggary.”133 Monopolies,
thus, “deprive the public of the services of men in the employments and
capacities in which they may be most useful to the community as well as
themselves.”134 U.S. corporations “should be the carefully restrained
creatures of the law and the servants of the people,” but as President
Cleveland warned, corporations were “fast becoming the people’s
masters.”135 Some may dispute such dire predictions. But even if
monopolies were beneficent, opportunity and liberty remain limited.
The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 “to put an end to great
aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before

132

See, e.g., Case of Monopolies, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (KB) 1263; Mitchel v.
Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (CH) 350 (explaining that monopolies deprive the
public of useful members); Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 260 U.S.
501, 512 (1923) (stating that competition laws “secure equality of opportunity and . . .
protect the public against evils commonly incident to destruction of competition through
monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade”); Thomas J. Horton, Restoring
American Antitrust’s Moral Arc, 62 S.D. L. REV. 11 (2017) (reconsidering the issue of
morality and antitrust from an interdisciplinary perspective that includes scholarship and
learning from such diverse fields as evolutionary biology and economics, philosophy and
history, and behavioral and socioeconomics); Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In
Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 384 (1965) (observing that antitrust laws
aimed “to expand the range of consumer choice and entrepreneurial opportunity by
encouraging the formation of markets of numerous buyers and sellers, assuring ease of
entry to such markets, and protecting participants—particularly small businessmen—
against exclusionary practices”).
133
United States v. Patterson, 55 F. 605, 611 (D. Mass. 1893).
134
Alger v. Thacher, 36 Mass. 51, 54 (1837).
135
Grover Cleveland, President of the U.S., Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1888), in 1
EARL W. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND
RELATED STATUTES 58 (1978).
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them.”136 If Congress did not heed this appeal, there would “soon be a
trust for every production and a master to fix the price for every necessity
of life.”137 One purpose of the Sherman Act is “to prefer a system of small
producers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill and
character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept the
direction of the few.”138
Data-opolies have several weapons to hinder autonomy. They can
direct (and limit) opportunities for start-ups that subsist on their superplatform. App developers subsist on Apple’s and Google’s popular mobile
phone operating system platform. Sellers and authors subsist on Amazon’s
online merchant and publishing platforms. Newspapers and journalists
depend on Facebook’s social network platform to reach younger readers.
One example, which the European Commission’s Google
Shopping Case explores, is how companies depend on traffic from
Google’s search engine.139 Google for years has dominated the general
search market. In 2004, it vertically integrated into the comparison
shopping market.140 But its product (Froogle) was subpar and competed
against several established players.141 Comparison shopping services,
however, relied to a large extent on traffic to be competitive.142 So to
disadvantage its rivals and improve its market position, Google, through
its dominant search engine, redirected traffic. It began pushing its own
comparison shopping service, which appeared at or near the top of the first
page of its search results, while relegating the rival (and superior)
comparison shopping services to the fourth or later page of its search
results.143 Most people click on the first few results provided by Google’s
search engine.144 Very few people go to the fourth page of results.145 As a
result, Google effectively diverted traffic to its own comparison shopping
service, while drying up the traffic to its rivals’ services.146
136

United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945).
21 CONG. REC. 2455, 2460 (1890).
138
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 427.
139
Google Shopping Search, supra note 3, at section 7.2.2.
140
European Commission Press Release IP/17/1784, Antitrust: Commission Fines
Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal
Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm [https://perma.cc/2EEK-KU96].
141
Id. (“Contemporary evidence from Google shows that the company was aware that
Froogle's market performance was relatively poor (one internal document from 2006
stated ‘Froogle simply doesn’t work’).”).
142
Id. (“More traffic leads to more clicks and generates revenue.”).
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
137

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144045
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144045

2018

GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

309

Venture capitalists now talk of “kill-zones” around the dataopolies.147 The data-opolies’ annual conferences “held to announce new
tools, features, and acquisitions, always ‘send shock waves of fear through
entrepreneurs,’” according to one investment firm, and “[v]enture
capitalists attend to see which of their companies are going to get killed
next.”148 After seeing what happened to Snap, after entering Facebook’s
kill zone, others may fear straying into the data-opolies’ sights.149 This can
only chill entrepreneurism and autonomy.
But the concerns go beyond the constellation of competing
services, app developers, sellers, journalists, musicians, writers,
photographers, and artists dependent on the super-platform to reach users.
Every individual’s autonomy is at stake. In 2017, the hedge fund Jana
Partners joined the California State Teachers’ Retirement pension fund to
demand that Apple do more to address the effects of its devices on
147

The Future of Tech Startups: Into the Danger Zone, ECONOMIST (U.K. edition), June
2,
2018,
at
61,
http://weblogibc-co.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/The_Economist_UK_Edition_-_June_02_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RKH7-82WK].
148
Id.
149
Id.; Andy Meek, Snapchat’s New Feature Focuses on Privacy, So Facebook Probably
Won’t
Steal
This,
YAHOO
FINANCE
(June
14,
2018),
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/snapchat-feature-focuses-privacy-facebook-probablywon-t-202229252.html [https://perma.cc/M8UK-KE53] (“The dynamic between the two
companies, of course, has seen Facebook — after unsuccessfully trying to buy Snap —
copy and repurpose everything of its smaller rival that it possibly can, like Stories and
ridiculous camera lenses.”). As Snap warned its investors,
Certain competitors, including Apple, Facebook, and Google, could use
strong or dominant positions in one or more markets to gain
competitive advantages against us in areas where we operate, including
by:
• integrating competing social media platforms or features into
products they control such as search engines, web browsers, or
mobile device operating systems;
• making acquisitions for similar or complementary products or
services; or
• impeding Snapchat’s accessibility and usability by modifying
existing hardware and software on which the Snapchat application
operates.
As a result, our competitors may acquire and engage users at the
expense of our user growth or engagement, which may seriously harm
our business.
Snap
Inc.,
Annual
Report
15
(Form
10-K)
(Feb.
21,
https://otp.tools.investis.com/clients/us/snap_inc/SEC/secshow.aspx?FilingId=12569789&Cik=0001564408&Type=PDF&hasPdf=1
[https://perma.cc/NX5D-58EC].
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children.150 As The Economist noted, “You know you are in trouble if a
Wall Street firm is lecturing you about morality.”151 The concern is that
the data-opolies’ products are purposefully addictive and thereby eroding
individuals’ ability to make free choices.
It is worth noting an interesting counterargument based on the
interplay between monopoly power and competition. On the one hand, in
monopolized markets, consumers have fewer competitive options. So,
arguably, there is less need to addict them. On the other hand, dataopolies, like Facebook and Google, even without significant rivals, can
increase profits by increasing our engagement with their products.152
This distinguishes data-opolies from past monopolies. Gillette,
before losing business to online rivals, controlled over seventy percent of
the U.S. men’s razors business.153 While many people shaved daily, there
were limits in consumption. Gillette could not induce users to reach for its
razor every few hours. But Facebook, even without significant rivals,
benefits financially when users are more engaged with its social network
platform. Facebook obtains more personal data. Engaged users post more
content, which attracts others to its social network. There are more
opportunities to target users with ads. Basically, in repeatedly targeting
150

Letter from JANA Partners and CalSTRS to Apple Inc. (Jan. 6, 2018),
https://thinkdifferentlyaboutkids.com/ [https://perma.cc/3K82-6H2X]; Robert G. Eccles,
Why an Activist Hedge Fund Cares Whether Apple’s Devices Are Bad for Kids, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Jan. 16, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/why-an-activist-hedge-fund-careswhether-apples-devices-are-bad-for-kids [https://perma.cc/MM9B-JH7Z].
151
Smith, supra note 2.
152
Tim Wu, Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law, ANTITRUST L.J.
(forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941094 [https://perma.cc/3KQ2-8MSQ];
see also OECD Big Data Report, supra note 43, at 12-13:
Attention platforms, such as search engines or social networks,
typically provide a set of ‘free’ services that are subsidised by
advertising sold on a ‘per-click’ basis. This way, instead of paying a
monetary price for the service, consumers pay with their attention, by
having paid results, organic results interspaced with publicity or by
being required to watch an advertisement before gaining access to a
content video. Arguably, consumers also pay by submitting their data,
either indirectly – through the website recording clicks for online
searches or shopping – or directly – through entering personal data into
an online form. The attention platform then uses the consumer’s private
data to improve the quality of the services and to better target
advertisements, allowing the platform to attract new consumers and to
charge a higher cost-per-click to advertisers.
153

Sharon Terlep, Gillette, Bleeding Market Share, Cuts Prices of Razors, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gillette-bleeding-market-share-cuts-pricesof-razors-1491303601 [https://perma.cc/U9GD-JWHU].
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people with ads, data-opolies can generate and then fulfill demand.154 As
Facebook tells investors, “We have over 184 million people using
Facebook every day in the U.S., which is considerably more than [the]
Super Bowl every day on mobile alone.”155 Facebook also attracts six
million advertisers.156 Thus, if increasing users’ engagement increases
revenues and profits, data-opolies have the incentive to exploit behavioral
biases and imperfect willpower to increase users’ addiction to their
platform—whether watching YouTube videos or posting on Instagram.157
Some of the harms from this addiction on adults’ and children’s
development are coming to light, including higher rates of depression and
less satisfaction with nearly every aspect of their lives.158
Moreover, traditional privacy concerns arise when a significant
volume and variety of personal data are concentrated in the hands of a few
data-opolies.159 Our autonomy is impinged with the resulting decline in:
•
•

associational privacy (in our choices of the persons, groups, or
causes with which we wish to associate),
physical privacy (in not having our movements tracked),

154

Facebook Inc., Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2017 Results Conference Call (2018), at
17, https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2017/Q4/Q4-17-Earnings-calltranscript.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3U2-CH22].
155
Id. at 12. The trends in the number of users affect Facebook’s “revenue and financial
results” by influencing the number of ads it can show, and the value of its ads to
marketers. Facebook 2018 10-K, supra note 77, at 35.
156
Facebook Inc., Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2017 Results Conference Call (2018), at
17, https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2017/Q4/Q4-17-Earnings-calltranscript.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3U2-CH22].
157
Betsy Morris, The New Tech Avengers, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2018, 8:10 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-tech-avengers-1530285064
[https://perma.cc/4WQZ-ABC3]; Levi Sumagaysay, Former Google, Facebook
Employees Step Up Battle Against Tech Addiction, MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 5, 2018, 3:01
PM),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/02/05/former-google-facebook-employeesstep-up-battle-against-tech-addiction/ [https://perma.cc/ELN3-SXT6]; Nellie Bowles,
Early Facebook and Google Employees Form Coalition to Fight What They Built, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/technology/early-facebookgoogle-employees-fight-tech.html [https://perma.cc/GF5U-SG8U].
158
Letter from Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood, to Mark Zuckerberg, CEO,
Facebook
(Jan.
30,
2018),
http://www.commercialfreechildhood.org/sites/default/files/develgenerate/gaw/FBMessengerKids.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZZJ-PSZM]; David Ginsberg,
Hard Questions: Is Spending Time on Social Media Bad for Us?, FACEBOOK (Dec. 15,
2017),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/12/hard-questions-is-spending-time-onsocial-media-bad-for-us/ [https://perma.cc/34W9-98UG].
159
Sofia Grafanaki, Autonomy Challenges in the Age of Big Data, 27 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 803 (2017).
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informational privacy (in choosing with whom we wish to disclose
our personal information),
decisional privacy (in not having a company intrude in our
personal decisions), and
intellectual privacy (namely, the freedom to explore topics and
issues without a company monitoring us).160
H. Political Concerns of Data-opolies

Economic power often translates into political power. Powerful
domestic producers, besides swaying the government to erect protectionist
measures, can also dampen the democratic process.161 As Justice Douglas
noted in 1948 and the courts later repeated:
Power that controls the economy should be in the hands of
elected representatives of the people, not in the hands of an
industrial oligarchy. Industrial power should be
decentralized. It should be scattered into many hands so
that the fortunes of the people will not be dependent on the
whim or caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional
stability of a few self-appointed men. The fact that they are
not vicious men but respectable and social minded is
irrelevant. That is the philosophy and the command of the
Sherman Act. It is founded on a theory of hostility to the
concentration in private hands of power so great that only a
government of the people should have it.162
Once power and wealth are concentrated, social policies are
directed to preserve the status quo. Invariably this concentration in
160

Anita L. Allen, Symposium: Privacy Jurisprudence as an Instrument of Social Change
First Amendment Privacy and the Battle for Progressively Liberal Social Change, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 885, 889 (2012) (providing different conceptions of privacy).
161
See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 412 (2005)
(discussing how the direct election of U.S. Senators was to counter the undue effects of
large corporations, monopolies, trusts, and other special-interest groups in the Senate
election process); Thomas J. Horton, The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and
the Eclipse of the Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to
Structural and Behavioral Antitrust Analyses, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469, 503–04 (2011);
Frank Maier-Rigaud, On the Normative Foundations of Competition Law: Efficiency,
Political Freedom and the Freedom to Compete, in THE GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW
132 (Daniel Zimmer ed., 2012).
162
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 536 (1948) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); see also United States v. Vandebrake, 771 F. Supp. 2d 961, 1000–01 (N.D.
Iowa 2011); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 164 (D.D.C. 1982).
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economic power threatens democratic ideals and leads to corporatism.163
Thus, antitrust’s underlying political concern is that private economic
power, like all absolute power, is subject to abuse and injurious to public
welfare. Such power must be decentralized to protect a free society from
its abuse. Competitively structured markets diffuse private power and
discipline economic decision-making; and antitrust policy is critical in
preserving competitive markets.
Data-opolies raise similar concerns about crony capitalism and
lobbying to help maintain their monopoly power. First, data-opolies have
every financial incentive to maintain (and increase) their profits. Google,
Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft had the largest absolute
increase in market capitalization between 2009 and 2017.164 As of June
2018, they were the largest U.S. public companies by market
capitalization.165 In 2017, Google “spent over $18 million lobbying
politicians,” which was “the first time a technology company has spent the
most on lobbying costs in at least two decades.”166 Likewise, compared to
2016 levels, Facebook increased its lobbying spending by nearly $3
million ($11.5 million), Apple by $2.3 million ($7 million), and Amazon
by nearly $2 million ($12.8 million).167
The lobbying can be direct. For example, the week after the public
learned that the FTC was investigating Google for monopolistic abuses,
the company hired twelve additional lobbying firms and increased its
lobbying expenses by eighty-eight percent, becoming among “the top 10

163

See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 569 n.5 (1972) (quoting
Senator Kefauver on the “evil” of increasing concentration “with more and more
corporations purchasing out their competitors” such that when “people lose their
economic freedom, they lose their political freedom”); Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust
and
Democracy:
Democracy
in
Antitrust
(Dec.
11,
2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086260 [https://perma.cc/CVH7-GSE6]; WALTER ADAMS &
JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX 305–6 (2004).
164
PWC, GLOBAL TOP 100 COMPANIES BY MARKET CAPITALISATION 21 (Mar. 31, 2017),
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/audit-services/assets/pdf/global-top-100-companies-2017final.pdf [https://perma.cc/GGL6-F2W2].
165
The Largest Companies by Market Capitalization Today, SYMBOL SURFING,
http://www.symbolsurfing.com/largest-companies-by-market-capitalization
[https://perma.cc/6SA8-KKB2]; see also Jeff Desjardins, Chart: The Largest Companies
by Market Cap over 15 Years, VISUAL CAPITALIST (Aug. 12, 2016, 11:18 AM),
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/chart-largest-companies-market-cap-15-years/
[https://perma.cc/K7B6-UEKR].
166
Alana Abramson, Google Spent Millions More Than its Rivals Lobbying Politicians
Last Year, TIME (Jan. 24, 2018), http://time.com/5116226/google-lobbying-2017/
[https://perma.cc/9D98-Q668].
167
Id.
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of spenders seeking to influence the federal government.”168 During this
time, Google “had a flurry of meetings with top officials at the White
House and Federal Trade Commission.”169 What was discussed is not
public. But the frequency of these meetings shows one firm’s unequaled
access to the highest levels of the Executive Branch and the opportunities
to align governmental policies with corporate interests.170 Thus, depending
on one’s view of political capture, it was (or was not) surprising when the
FTC Commissioners, contrary to the recommendations of the legal staff,
closed its Google investigation.
Data-opolies also can lobby indirectly. They can influence the
debate through the funding of articles, academic initiatives, and think
tanks.171 Data-opolies and their executives can voice their displeasure (and
possibility of withholding their funding) to groups that question their
abuses, power, or policy recommendations.172 Data-opolies can seek to
influence the privacy debate by downplaying privacy and advertising
regulations, which threaten their advertising-dependent economic model.
In contrast to the E.U.’s General Data Protection Regulation and
forthcoming ePrivacy regulation, which potentially threaten the
advertising-dependent data-opolies, and California’s Consumer Privacy
168

Jonathan D. Salant, Google’s Increased Lobbying Belies Cut in Total Spending,
BLOOMBERG
TECH.
(Jan.
30,
2013,
4:34
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-01-30/google-s-increased-lobbyingbelies-cut-in-total-spending [https://perma.cc/AJ65-KNXT].
169
Brody Mullins, Google Makes Most of Close Ties to White House, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
24, 2015, 9:24 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-makes-most-of-close-ties-towhite-house-1427242076 [https://perma.cc/E9D8-4BAD].
170
Evidence suggests that political access is of significant value to corporations. See
generally Jeffrey R. Brown & Jiekun Huang, All The President’s Friends: Political
Access and Firm Value (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23356,
2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23356 [https://perma.cc/D624-2QLL]. Using data
on White House visitors from 2009 through 2015, the study found that corporate
executives’ meetings with key policymakers were associated with positive abnormal
stock returns, and that “following meetings with federal government officials, firms
receive more government contracts and are more likely to receive regulatory relief (as
measured by the tone of regulatory news).”
171
Brody Mullins, Paying Professors: Inside Google’s Academic Influence Campaign,
WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2017, 9:14 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/paying-professorsinside-googles-academic-influence-campaign-1499785286
[https://perma.cc/RPR5JQQU].
172
Kenneth P. Vogel, New America, a Google-Funded Think Tank, Faces Backlash for
Firing
a
Google
Critic,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
1,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/us/politics/anne-marie-slaughter-new-americagoogle.html [https://perma.cc/AP7G-DC9W]; Kenneth P. Vogel, Google Critic Ousted
from Think Tank Funded by the Tech Giant, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/us/politics/eric-schmidt-google-new-america.html
[https://perma.cc/RCV5-ES9S].
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Act of 2018, Congress has not enacted any significant privacy protections.
Data-opolies likely will lobby against significant privacy protections,
including providing users a property right (or greater legal rights) over
their data and enhancing data portability (to the extent it threatens their
power).173
Unlike earlier monopolies, data-opolies, given how they interact
with individuals, possess a far more powerful tool: their ability to affect
the public debate and public’s perception of right and wrong. Many people
now receive their news from social media platforms. In 2017, Facebook
outstripped “all other social media sites as a source of news,” with fortyfive percent of Americans receiving news on Facebook.174 YouTube was
the second most common social media site for news.175
But the news is not passively transmitted and consumed. Dataopolies can affect how we feel and think. One example is Facebook’s
emotional contagion study, where it manipulated 689,003 users’
emotions.176 Data-opolies, with the development of personal digital
173

SYMONS & BASS, supra note 64, at 32 (noting that part of the “difficulty for making
personal data open is the lack of [existing] legal, technical or economic norms that would
allow people to both collect, control and share their own data. If this were possible, then
people might be able to share their data for specific projects or causes, or share it under
specific conditions”); Kieren McCarthy, Google Lobbies Hard to Derail New US Privacy
Laws – Using Dodgy Stats: Expect to Hear A Lot About Censorship and Criminals in the
Next
Few
Months,
REGISTER
(Mar.
26,
2018,
8:52
PM),
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/03/26/as_tech_criticism_grows_google_lobbies_to_u
ndercut_new_privacy_laws/ [https://perma.cc/J3H9-ZEWJ]; Daisuke Wakabayashi,
California Passes Sweeping Law to Protect Online Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/technology/california-online-privacy-law.html
[https://perma.cc/8YDQ-RPUD] (Google and Facebook, among others, each contributed
$200,000 to a committee opposing California’s proposed ballot measure on privacy, with
lobbyists estimating that businesses would spend $100 million to campaign against it
before the November election).
174
Elisa Shearer & Jeffrey Gottfried, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2017,
PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-acrosssocial-media-platforms-2017/ [https://perma.cc/8E2N-EKQH].
175
Id.
176
Facebook sought to examine “emotional contagion,” whereby people transfer positive
and negative moods and emotions to others. Adam D. I. Kramer, Jamie E. Guillory &
Jeffrey T. Hancock, Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion
Through Social Networks, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8788 (2014). This was the “first
experimental evidence for massive-scale emotional contagion via social networks.” Id. at
8789. People, when posting on Facebook, frequently express positive or negative
emotions. Their friends later see these posts via Facebook’s “News Feed” product.
Facebook uses a ranking algorithm that continually tests which content is shown or
omitted in the News Feed. The aim is to show particular Facebook users “the content they
will find most relevant and engaging.” Id. at 8788. Facebook, as part of the study,
intentionally manipulated its News Feed algorithm. Some users received less positive
content. Others received less negative emotional content. When Facebook surreptitiously
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assistants, can be even more active in shaping our thoughts. In 2017,
Google announced it is incorporating artificial intelligence (AI) into its
Gmail service, used by over a billion people, “for features such as
suggesting responses to messages.”177 Similarly, Facebook is using AI, as
part of its personal assistant technology, to provide suggestions to users
based on their private conversations.178 Among other things, data-opolies
may suggest books, articles, photos, or posts users may wish to share.
These practices bring with them many risks, one of which is bias.
Data-opolies may simply cater to users who prefer news that supports their
preexisting beliefs. One 2015 study of over ten million Facebook users
“observed substantial polarization among hard [news] content shared by
users, with the most frequently shared links clearly aligned with largely
liberal or conservative populations.”179 After the algorithm ranked the
stories,180 Facebook users were slightly less likely to see politically
different viewpoints.181 Individual choice, however, further substantially
limited users’ exposure to ideologically cross-cutting content.182 Facebook
has sought to patent technologies to infer personality traits from users’
posts and messages: “It describes judging your degree of extroversion,
openness or emotional stability, then using those characteristics to select
which news stories or ads to display.”183 Thus, a data-opoly will not
reduced friends’ positive content in the News Feed for one week, the users were less
positive: “a larger percentage of words in the users’ status updates were negative and a
smaller percentage were positive.” Id. at 8789. When Facebook surreptitiously reduced
their friends’ negative content in the News Feed, the Facebook users were less negative
themselves. People who were exposed to fewer emotional posts (either positive or
negative) in their News Feed “were less expressive overall on the following days.” Id. at
8790. In manipulating the News Feed, Facebook could influence users’ moods.
177
Google Assistant Coming to iPhones; Will Take on Siri, WION (May 18, 2017,
1:11PM), https://www.wionews.com/science-tech/google-assistant-coming-to-iphoneswill-take-on-siri-15719 [https://perma.cc/3GYZ-QLFT]; Karissa Bell, Gmail Can Use
Google’s AI to Write Replies for You, MASHABLE (May 17, 2017),
http://mashable.com/2017/05/17/gmail-smart-replies/#wbmaFUiXlOqK
[https://perma.cc/FZG8-W9PF].
178
Kurt Wagner, Facebook Is Using AI in Private Messages to Suggest an Uber or
Remind
You
to
Pay
a
Friend,
RECODE
(Apr.
6,
2017),
https://www.recode.net/2017/4/6/15203526/facebook-messenger-m-artificialintelligence-ai-bots [https://perma.cc/VPR2-8JDE].
179
Eytan Bakshy et al., Exposure to Ideologically Diverse News and Opinion on
Facebook, 348 SCIENCE 1130, 1130 (2015).
180
The order in “which users see stories in the News Feed depends on many factors,
including how often the viewer visits Facebook, how much they interact with certain
friends, and how often users have clicked on links to certain websites in News Feed in the
past.” Id. at 1131.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Chinoy, supra note 122.
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necessarily provide an ideologically diverse news stream.184 Instead, in
filtering the information we receive based on our preferences, a data-opoly
can reduce the viewpoints we receive, thereby leading to “echo chambers”
and “filter bubbles.”185
A second risk is censorship, whereby a data-opoly, through its
platform, controls or blocks the content that users can access.186 The dataopoly can enforce governmental censorship of information with particular
religious, political, and sexual orientations.187 For example, in 2017 Apple
removed several popular apps that enabled users to evade government
censorship from its app store in China.188 Additionally, the data-opoly can
self-censor as to what content is appropriate. Facebook is currently
grappling with this issue and, in 2017, asked users for input on several
questions, including:
•
•

How aggressively should social media companies monitor and
remove controversial posts and images from their platforms?
Who gets to decide what is controversial, especially in a global
community with a multitude of cultural norms?

184

Due to pervasive psychological confirmation biases, users are unlikely to want to hear
both the conservative and liberal slant for every news story. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn,
The Law of the Zebra, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 155, 210 (2013) (“Particularly when the
topic is an emotionally-charged or threatening issue, confirmation bias is a common
occurrence.”).
185
OECD Background Note, supra note 48, at 42; see also OECD, Algorithms and
Collusion: Note by the European Commission, at 2, DAF/COMP/WD(2017)12 (June 14,
2017) (noting that when it comes to recommending newspaper articles, personalization
can limit the range of views that consumers are exposed to, which is the so-called “filter
bubble” or “echo chamber” phenomenon).
186
OECD Background Note, supra note 48, at 43; Greg Ip, How Google and Facebook
Are Monopolizing Ideas, WALL ST. J. (July 4, 2018, 10:05 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-google-and-facebook-are-monopolizing-ideas1530713153 [https://perma.cc/8DUP-W3FR]; David Dayen, Google Is So Big, It Is Now
Shaping Policy to Combat the Opioid Epidemic. And It’s Screwing It Up, INTERCEPT
(Oct. 17, 2017), https://theintercept.com/2017/10/17/google-search-drug-use-opioidepidemic/ [https://perma.cc/C99D-5XTQ].
187
Paul Mozur, China Presses Its Internet Censorship Efforts Across the Globe, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/technology/chinatechnology-censorship-borders-expansion.html [https://perma.cc/ZH6T-E487].
188
Paul Mozur, Apple Removes Apps from China Store That Help Internet Users Evade
Censorship,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
30,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/30/technology/china-apple-censorhip.html
[https://perma.cc/3JR4-2RMT].
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Who gets to define what’s false news—and what’s simply
controversial political speech?189

Ultimately the answers will come not from users, but from
Facebook and other data-opolies. In 2018, Facebook posted its community
standards, which gave it wide discretion. For example, at times, Facebook
“will allow content that might otherwise violate our standards if we feel
that it is newsworthy, significant, or important to the public interest. We
do this only after weighing the public interest value of the content against
the risk of real-world harm.”190 Showing how subjective (or fickle) this
can be, Instagram, in 2018, deleted a video by the non-profit news outlet
ProPublica, identifying members of a white violent supremacist group
because the video supposedly violated its terms of service. As
ProPublica’s editor-in-chief remarked, “A platform that censors
journalism because it cannot distinguish between racist rants and
investigative reporting clearly needs to review its procedures.”191
A third risk is manipulation.192 One illustration is the use of the
data-opoly’s platform to manipulate elections. We are learning more how
the Russian government used Facebook, Google, and Twitter to influence
the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections. The Special Counsel, in one
indictment, alleged how Russian groups, “through fraud and deceit,
created hundreds of social media accounts and used them to develop
certain fictitious U.S. personas into ‘leader[s] of public opinion’ in the
United States.”193 Their strategic goal was “to sow discord in the U.S.
political system, including the 2016 U.S. presidential election.”194
To sow discord in the U.S. political system, the Russians relied on,
among other things, the data-opolies’ social media platforms such as
Google’s YouTube, Facebook’s social network, and Instagram.195 By
2016, the size of the online followers of many of their controlled online
groups had grown to hundreds of thousands of online followers. The
189

Facebook,
Hard
Questions,
FACEBOOK
(June
15,
2017),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/hard-questions/ [https://perma.cc/3BHV-88VU].
190
Facebook,
Community
Standards,
https://m.facebook.com/communitystandards#attacks-on-public-figures
[https://perma.cc/DN4J-T8N2].
*191
Rob Price, Instagram Deleted a Video by a News Outlet That Identified Members of a
White Supremacist Group, BUS. INSIDER (June 21, 2018, 8:59 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/instagram-deletes-propublica-video-white-supremacistgroup-2018-6 [https://perma.cc/SJ4V-X9XP].
192
OECD Background Note, supra note 48.
193
Indictment at ¶ 32, U.S. v. Internet Research Agency, Case 1:18-cr-00032-DLF
(D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018).
194
Id. at ¶ 6.
195
Id. at ¶ 10.
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Russians spent thousands of dollars every month advertising their groups
on social media sites. Pretending to be grass-roots organizations, they also
used the social media sites to stage U.S. political rallies. The data-opolies
provided an effective arsenal for the Russian’s proclaimed “information
warfare against the United States of America,” with the stated goal of
“spread[ing] distrust towards the candidates and the political system in
general.”196 According to Facebook’s estimates, over 126 million
Facebook users saw some of these Russian groups’ propaganda.197 The
Russians generated over 131,000 tweets and uploaded over 1,000 videos
on Google’s YouTube service.198
If Russia can manipulate the U.S. elections through its postings,
just consider the data-opolies’ power to manipulate elections. Jonathan
Zittrain warned of the super-platform’s potential ability to predict political
views, identify party affiliation, and engage in targeted campaigning to
mobilize distinct groups of voters to take action.199 Robert Epstein,
likewise, illustrated how Google, in manipulating the rankings of its
search results, could shift the voting preferences of undecided voters by
“20 percent or more—up to 80 percent in some demographic groups—
with virtually no one knowing they are being manipulated.”200 Dataopolies can promote stories that further their particular business or
political interests, instead of stories that are relevant or high-quality.
So unlike earlier media monopolies, data-opolies can interact
directly with users, collect data about them, and better target them. With
more levers to affect public opinion, the risk of abuse increases. As one
report aptly summarized:
The increasing value of greater data supply would lead to
a consolidation in the number of platforms people use to
196

Id.
Mike Isaac & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Russian Influence Reached 126 Million Through
Facebook
Alone,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
30,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/technology/facebook-google-russia.html
[https://perma.cc/D2CX-4RMC]; Garrett Graff, Inside the Mueller Indictment: a Russian
Novel of Intrigue, WIRED (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/inside-themueller-indictment-a-russian-novel-of-intrigue/ [https://perma.cc/EF7V-QY35].
198
Isaac & Wakabayashi, supra note 197; Graff, supra note 197.
199
Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone Ever Finding
Out: The Scary Future of Digital Gerrymandering—and How to Prevent It, NEW
REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117878/information-fiduciarysolution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/HHU8-8HF8].
200
Robert Epstein, How Google Could Rig the 2016 Election: Google Has the Ability to
Drive Millions of Votes to a Candidate with No One the Wiser, POLITICO (Aug. 19,
2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/how-google-could-rig-the-2016election-121548 [https://perma.cc/ZW9F-N9TY].
197
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conduct their online lives. Network effects would enable
internet giants to eliminate or acquire competition, making
them even bigger, to a massively greater extent than we
witness today. The handful of large platforms would begin
to provide a comprehensive life management service, from
shopping, banking, transport, work, health and social
networking. All of these activities would be dataintensive, running on insights drawn from historic data all
the while collecting evermore data.
The vastness of the personal data universe, and the
sophistication of new technologies, would make regulation
difficult. There would be considerable scope for personal
data to be used to manipulate people for malign purposes.
It could undermine democracy, a fair economy and social
cohesion. People may be excluded from banking services,
insurance, housing, jobs and even social activities on the
basis of their data points. A sense of perpetual digital
surveillance would cloak society, compromising any sense
of freedom.201
III. DATA-OPOLIES CAN BE MORE DURABLE
While data-opolies raise many potential harms, we would be less
concerned if their power were transient. But several factors can make dataopolies more durable than prior monopolies.
First, the nature of these data-driven industries often involves high
up-front sunk costs and close-to-zero marginal costs.202 This cost structure
can facilitate market concentration of Big Data in the hands of a few
players.203
Second, several network effects help protect data-opolies’
204
power. Firms still compete in markets with network effects. But these
markets, given the network effects, can tip towards one or two products or
201

SYMONS & BASS, supra note 64, at 34.
OECD Big Data Report, supra note 43, at 11 (“The information technologies required
to store and process the data can be very costly, involving vast data centres, servers, dataanalytical software, internet connections with advanced firewalls and expensive human
resources, such as computer scientists and programmers. Once the system is fully
operational, the incremental data can ‘train’ and improve the algorithms at a low cost
(thereby also the product or service quality).”).
203
Id.
204
See Google Shopping Search, supra note 3, ¶¶ 285–305 (discussing barriers to general
search services); STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 1, at 162–200 (discussing several
different data-driven network effects).
202
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platforms. As the D.C. Circuit stated in the Microsoft antitrust case, as a
product or standard increases in popularity, it trends towards dominance
precisely “because the utility that a user derives from consumption of the
good increases with the number of other agents consuming the good.”205
Once the market tips and dominance is achieved, it is harder for smaller
competitors to scale up to dethrone a data-opoly: “threats come largely
from outside the dominated market, because the degree of dominance of
such a market tends to become so extreme.”206
A result of these data-driven network effects is to limit one’s
incentives to switch to better alternatives, if any exist.207 Users, for
example, may have been angry with Facebook after the Cambridge
Analytica scandal. But they could not unilaterally switch to another social
network if their friends remained on Facebook. Thus, the
#DeleteFacebook campaign fizzled.208 Users may prefer DuckDuckGo’s
privacy policies but remain with the dominant search engine, which,
benefitting from network effects, offers better results. Drivers might prefer
a more privacy-focused navigation app but stick with Google’s dominant
Maps or Waze apps, which, again benefitting from network effects, has
better traffic information. As the OECD observed, “The dominant
platform may not do anything that can be properly qualified as
anticompetitive, and yet the feedback loop can reinforce dominance and
prevent rival platforms from gaining customers.”209
Third, innovation, rather than disrupting the status quo, may
simply reinforce user lock-in and the data-opolies’ power.210 Data, which
conceivably could benefit multiple constituencies, including non-profit
and governmental entities, now benefit primarily one party, or group of
market participants (such as advertisers). The data-opoly can dictate who

205

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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is granted access to the data and for what purpose, and thereby influence
the nature of innovation.
Fourth, the harm from a data-opoly is often less salient. One
assumption is that a monopoly’s supra-competitive pricing attracts
entry.211 Besides signaling to potential entrants an investment opportunity,
exploitive prices can engender consumer outrage, increase scrutiny from
lawmakers, and cause adverse reputational effects. In contrast to excessive
pricing, the data-opoly, when using the data internally, does not signal to
the marketplace its exploitive use of data.212 Many consumers do not know
all the data being collected about them, the use of the data, and the extent
to which they are being exploited as a result of the data collection.
Moreover, data-opolies can persist when their tactics to attain or
maintain their dominance avoid antitrust scrutiny. Data-opolies’ anticompetitive conduct may be harder to detect, such as their use of the nowcasting radar to squelch nascent competitive threats, their foreclosing of
rivals’ access to data necessary for them to compete, their leveraging of a
data-advantage in one market to gain an advantage in another market, or
their increasing customers’ switching costs. Moreover, as our book
explores, there has been less scrutiny of data-driven mergers by these
dominant firms.213 Competition authorities’ price-centric tools for
assessing mergers are often ill-equipped for data-driven mergers, where
the service is offered for “free” and advertisers are not harmed. Datadriven mergers (such as if Google or Facebook acquired IAC, which
controls the online dating platforms Match, Tinder, PlentyOfFish, and
OkCupid) often defy the horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate categories
used to assess mergers.
Finally, governmental support of data-opolies might be harder to
detect. If a monopoly results from mandatory government standards, trade
barriers (a concern during the Sherman Act’s enactment), or other
governmental intervention (such as granting the company an exclusive
franchise or license), this reflects little on the company’s skill and more on
its political might. For example, high tariffs aided du Pont’s dominance of
the U.S. cellophane market.214 One risk of these governmental protections
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is their visibility. Citizens, competitors, or the opposing political party
may cry foul. Data-opolies can enlist the government, albeit more
discreetly.
Consequently, one cannot conclude that data-opolies are
ephemeral. Instead, the feedback loop from data-driven network effects
can reinforce dominance and prevent rivals, especially those dependent on
the data-opoly’s platform, from gaining momentum. Data-opolies can use
their now-casting radar to squelch any nascent threats. The reality is that
data-opolies are not only possible in data-driven markets but in some
industries, given the network effects, are very likely.
CONCLUSION
Several themes run throughout this article. First, the harms from
data-opolies can exceed that of earlier monopolies. They can affect not
only our wallets but our privacy, autonomy, democracy, and well-being.
Second, the data-driven markets dominated by these firms will not
necessarily self-correct. Third, antitrust enforcement can play a key role.
But antitrust enforcement, while a necessary tool to prevent data-opolies
and deter their abuses, is not sufficient. Antitrust enforcers must
coordinate with privacy and consumer protection officials to ensure that
the conditions for effective privacy competition are in place.
My antitrust professor presciently forewarned, in 1979, how it was
“bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political values in
interpreting the antitrust laws.”215 Professor Pitofsky raised several
concerns: first, “how excessive concentration of economic power will
breed antidemocratic political pressures”; second, a “desire to enhance
individual and business freedom by reducing the range within which
private discretion by a few in the economic sphere controls the welfare of
all”; and third, “that if the free-market sector of the economy is allowed to
develop under antitrust rules that are blind to all but economic concerns,
the likely result will be an economy so dominated by a few corporate
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giants that it will be impossible for the state not to play a more intrusive
role in economic affairs.”216
The Reagan administration, in espousing the then-popular Chicago
School of economics beliefs, discounted these concerns. Now with the rise
of a progressive, anti-monopoly New Brandeis School, the pendulum is
swinging the other way.217 With the emergence of data-opolies, this is a
welcome change.
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